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INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, GENERAL FEDERAL
LAWS, AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION:
AN OVERVIEW AND UPDATE
Bryan H. Wildenthal *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the application within Indian
country of federal regulatory laws—typically dealing with labor
relations, employment, health, the environment, or other social and
economic issues—and their impact on Indian Nation governments
and tribal enterprises. Such laws are often described as “federal
law[s] of general applicability,”1 or as I would put it more simply,
“general federal laws” (GFLs). Such laws are “general” in the
sense that they are not specialized Indian legislation aimed
primarily at tribal issues or concerns. Rather, they appear on their
face to be relevant to all Americans, Indian or non-Indian, whether
living within Indian country or not. This article takes the position
that GFLs, just like specialized Indian legislation and all laws
potentially affecting the ancient rights and sovereignty of Indian
Nations, should be subjected to the rules of interpretation
commonly known as the Indian law “canons of construction.”2
*

Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (San Diego); J.D.,
Stanford Law School (see http://www.tjsl.edu/directory/bryan-h-wildenthal and
http://ssrn.com/author=181791). I have regularly taught the course in American
Indian Law at Thomas Jefferson since joining the faculty there in 1996. For
much of that time, this has been the only such course taught by a full-time
faculty member at any California law school south of Los Angeles. I also teach
in the fields of constitutional law, civil procedure, and federal courts, among
others, and have written a college textbook, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY
ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS (ABC-CLIO,
2003), along with numerous articles in leading law reviews on subjects
including constitutional law and history, American Indian law, and the rights of
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. I dedicate this article to my
beloved husband, Ashish Agrawal. He encouraged me to accept the invitation to
speak at the 2015 ILC (see note 3) and has always unstintingly supported my
scholarly endeavors.
1
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., LexisNexis, 2012), § 2.03, at 123.
2
See generally Part II; COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.02, at
113−23, and § 2.03, at 123−28. On the definition of a GFL, see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of
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In April 2015, I completed a much shorter version of this
article in connection with my presentation at the Federal Bar
Association’s 40th Annual Indian Law Conference.3 I previously
published two major articles on this subject in the Oregon Law
Review (2007) and Michigan State Law Review (2008).4 Many
other scholars have undertaken valuable studies of this area. In
particular, no discussion of the subject should proceed without
acknowledging the crucial articles by Professor Alex Tallchief
Skibine (1991) and Professor Vicki Limas (1994), and the treatise
by Kaighn Smith, Jr. (2011), a leading practitioner in the field.5
See also the prescient early article by Joseph J. Brecher (1977).6
Even eight years before the notorious decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal
Farm (1985) (“Coeur d’Alene”),7 Brecher accurately perceived and
anticipated the emerging trends.
This article updates my 2007 and 2008 articles. It reviews
some key points about the Ninth Circuit’s remarkable three-judge
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 493, 499−502 (2007) (hereinafter Wildenthal
2007).
3
Federal Bar Association, 40th Annual Indian Law Conference: Conference
Materials 342 (April 9−10, 2015). The theme of the 2015 ILC, held at Talking
Stick Resort, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community (near Scottsdale,
Arizona), was “Forty Years Strong: The Indian Self-Determination Era
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty.” The article grew out of my participation on
Plenary Panel 6, “Standing Strong: Inherent Tribal Governmental Status” (April
10, 2015).
4
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2; Bryan H. Wildenthal, How the Ninth Circuit
Overruled a Century of Supreme Court Indian Jurisprudence—And Has So Far
Gotten Away With It, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 547 (2008) (hereinafter
Wildenthal 2008); see also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf
Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical State of
American Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REV. 113 (2002) (hereinafter Wildenthal
2002) (offering several wide-ranging observations on Indian law).
5
Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes
and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (1991); Limas, Application
of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes:
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681
(1994); see also SMITH, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY
(2011). Professor Skibine made another important contribution to this field with
his recent article, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal
Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 21 WASH. & LEE. J. CIV. RTS. & SOCIAL
JUSTICE 123 (2016).
6
Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some
Problems and Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 285 (1977).
7
751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that general federal laws should
presumptively apply to on-reservation Indian Nation employment and other
activities).
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panel opinion in Coeur d’Alene, which—for more than thirty years
now—has frustrated lawyers in Indian country and out-muscled the
Supreme Court itself in influencing other lower-court rulings on
how to interpret GFLs in relation to Indian country. Coeur d’Alene
effectively overruled—in many federal circuits and for many
GFLs—the weight of more than a century of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the Indian law canons of construction.
This article also reviews some aspects of the notorious San
Manuel cases. In that litigation, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) in 2004, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2007, incoherently deployed
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine to extend the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) to on-reservation employment by tribal
government-owned gaming enterprises—even though Congress
never authorized or intended such an extension.8 That specific
issue of federal labor law, and the broader dispute over Coeur
d’Alene, emerged again in 2015 with appeals to the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits over application of the NLRA to tribal casinos.9 The
appeals were resolved by three important decisions discussed in
Part V of this article: one by the NLRB (effectively mooting the
Tenth Circuit appeal) and two by the Sixth Circuit.
Part II discusses the classical canons of construction
governing Indian law and contrasts them with the perverse and
ill-conceived Coeur d’Alene doctrine which has flourished in the
lower federal courts. Part III highlights the stunning degree of
irony—not to mention outright defiance of the Supreme Court—in
the lower courts’ treatment of the Supreme Court’s 1960 decision
8

San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055 (2004), enforced by
San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 2007); see generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2.
9
The Sixth Circuit appeals, brought by two Indian Nations in Michigan,
challenged the NLRB’s assertions of jurisdiction in Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2014) (concerning the Little River Casino
Resort), and Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (2014)
(operated by the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe). District courts in the Sixth
Circuit had rejected preliminary challenges to NLRB jurisdiction in Little River
Band of Ottawa Indians v. NLRB, 747 F. Supp. 2d 872 (WD MI 2010), and
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. NLRB, 838 F. Supp. 2d 598 (ED MI 2011).
The Tenth Circuit appeal challenged Chickasaw Nation, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 163
(2013) (asserting jurisdiction over Chickasaw’s WinStar World Casino). A
district court in the Tenth Circuit had initially enjoined the NLRB from asserting
jurisdiction, in Chickasaw Nation v. NLRB, No. CIV-11-506-W (WD OK, July
11, 2011), but a partial settlement allowed the NLRB to proceed with a limited
assertion of jurisdiction, subject to the appeal.
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in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.10 Part
IV discusses continuing struggles over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine
in the lower federal courts. Finally, Part V discusses the 2015
decisions and where things have gone from there.
II.

COMPETING CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

The Ninth Circuit in Coeur d’Alene held that a GFL, even
if silent on the issue, presumptively applies to Indian tribes unless
the tribe shows that (1) it intrudes on “purely intramural” tribal
self-government, (2) it conflicts with an “explicit” or “specific”
tribal-treaty right, or (3) Congress affirmatively intended it not to
apply.11
By contrast, the classical Indian law canons of construction,
developed and reiterated in a multitude of Supreme Court decisions
from 1832 to 2014, require that courts (1) construe treaties and
agreements with tribes as the Indians themselves would have
understood them, including broadly implied tribal rights even in
the absence of explicit or specific treaty language (the “treaty
canon”), (2) construe treaties, statutes, and other sources of law
liberally in favor of Indians, so as to resolve any ambiguities or
uncertainties in their favor (the “ambiguity canon”), and (3)
construe federal statutes not to abrogate or limit tribal sovereign
rights (including but not limited to treaty rights), rather to preserve
them, unless Congress clearly intended such laws to limit such
rights (the “congressional intent canon”). Among the most
important landmark cases supporting those canons are Worcester v.
Georgia (1832) (in an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall),12
United States v. Winans (1905),13 Yakima County v. Yakima Indian
Nation (1992),14 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians (1999),15 and, most recently, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community (2014).16
10

362 U.S. 99 (1960).
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115−16 (setting forth basic “rule” and three
“exceptions”); see also id. at 1117 (discussing whether any treaty “explicitly” or
“specifically” protects a relevant tribal right).
12
31 U.S. 515, 551−56 (1832); see also id. at 563, 582 (McLean, J., concurring).
13
198 U.S. 371, 380−84 (1905).
14
502 U.S. 251, 258, 269 (1992).
15
526 U.S. 172, 193−208 (1999).
16
134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030−32 (2014).
11
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The Court’s 1999 Mille Lacs decision systematically
applied the classical canons to an 1837 treaty, an 1850 presidential
executive order,17 an 1855 treaty,18 and the 1858 act of Congress
admitting Minnesota to statehood.19 This case has not received
nearly the attention it deserves. In 2002, I published one of the first
discussions in the law review literature of Mille Lacs and its
application of the canons—also discussing Chief Justice William
Rehnquist’s shocking dissent from the 5-4 decision—and noting
the similar analysis (effectively equivalent to the canons) in Idaho
v. United States (2001).20
The 1992 Yakima case illustrates the degree of consensus
on the modern Supreme Court supporting the overall force and
applicability of the canons. Justice Antonin Scalia—generally
known as hostile to Indian claims—wrote for an 8-1 majority
applying both the congressional intent and ambiguity canons.
While the case did not involve a GFL, Justice Scalia declared
broadly that “[w]hen we are faced with … two possible
constructions [of federal law], our choice between them must be
dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian
jurisprudence: [the ambiguity canon].”21 Justice Harry Blackmun,
17

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 16, at 193–95 & n. 5 (discussing 1837 treaty and 1850
order).
18
Id. at 195−202.
19
Id. at 202−08.
20
533 U.S. 262 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Mille Lacs, 526 U.S.
at 208−20 (joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.) was truly outrageous
and merits more extended treatment than I have yet been able to provide. The
same four justices, again led by Rehnquist, also dissented in Idaho, 533 U.S. at
281−88. See Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 131−35 (discussing Mille Lacs
and Idaho); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 495 & n. 258, 499 & n. 270
(discussing Idaho); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 5, at 587−88 & nn. 215-18
(discussing Mille Lacs and Idaho). On Mille Lacs, see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2012), supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 115-16; id. § 2.03, at 123, and on Idaho, id. §
2.02[3], at 119−20.
21
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269; see also id. at 258 (quoting and applying the
congressional intent canon). It is understood that “ambiguity” (while often used
loosely in common parlance) is not exactly synonymous with “vagueness” or
“uncertainty.” Strictly speaking—as suggested by Justice Scalia’s reference
quoted in the text to “two possible constructions”—“ambiguous” connotes a
duality of possible meaning. The canon at issue (sometimes expressed as two
closely related canons) supports sympathetic construction of any indeterminate
text. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 113 & nn. 2−3
(referring not only to “ambiguities” but also to “doubtful expressions” construed
“generously” or “liberally” in favor of Indians). It is nevertheless most often
described in terms of “ambiguity,” and for reasons of convenient economy this
article follows that style.
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the only (partial) dissenter, emphatically endorsed the Court’s
restatement of the canons and complained only that it failed to
apply them vigorously enough in favor of the tribe.22 Thus, Yakima
stands as a resounding and unanimous modern reaffirmation of the
classical canons—at least by the Supreme Court.
Four notable Supreme Court decisions during the 1980s
forthrightly applied the canons to a series of garden-variety GFLs:
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) (applying the ambiguity
and congressional intent canons to, inter alia, the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978),23 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians (1984) (applying the congressional intent
canon to the Federal Power Act),24 United States v. Dion (1986)
(applying the congressional intent canon to the Eagle Protection
Act),25 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante (1987)
(applying the congressional intent canon to the federal diversity
jurisdiction statute).26 Merrion predated Coeur d’Alene by almost
three years and was actually discussed by the Ninth Circuit in
Coeur d’Alene, though in an astonishingly misleading way that
ignored and evaded Merrion’s reaffirmation and use of the
canons.27 The Supreme Court itself has not forgotten those cases. It
cited Dion and Iowa Mutual with approval in its 2014 Bay Mills
decision.28
I have argued that the Mille Lacs and Idaho cases, along
with the decisions almost a century earlier in Winans (1905) and
Winters v. United States (1908),29 may also be viewed as examples
of the Supreme Court applying the canons to GFLs, on the ground
that the statehood enabling and admission acts at issue are properly
viewed as such. Statehood acts are not specialized Indian
legislation. They have general and national impact, not just on the
state admitted.30 Concededly, however, the interaction between
22

Yakima, 502 U.S. at 270−78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
23
455 U.S. 130, 149−52 (1982).
24
466 U.S. 765, 767−69, 781–87 (1984).
25
476 U.S. 734, 738−46 (1986).
26
480 U.S. 9, 17−18 (1987).
27
See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 573−79.
28
Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2032.
29
207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also Winans, 198 U.S. 371; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S.
172; Idaho, 533 U.S. 262.
30
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493−502; see also supra note 20 (citing
Idaho and discussing Mille Lacs).
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statehood acts and Indian rights may be viewed by some as a
distinctive issue unlikely to control judicial interpretation of GFLs
dealing with labor, employment, the environment, and the like.31
31

My 2007 article appears to have had an impact on the leading treatise in the
field of American Indian law. It is prominently cited at the outset of a key
section of COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123 n. 2, one of
only three law review articles cited in that section, see id. at 124 n. 13 (citing
Skibine 1991, supra note 5, 126 n. 23 (citing Limas, supra note 5), Indeed, that
section—which focuses on the interaction of the canons with GFLs—appears to
have been carefully rewritten for the 2012 edition in direct response to my 2007
article, which offered some criticisms (reluctant and sympathetic) of the 2005
edition’s treatment of the case law analyzing GFLs. Compare COHEN’S
HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123−28, with COHEN’S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis, 2005), §
2.03, at 128−32; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 480−86; Wildenthal
2008, supra note 4, at 569−71.
I had expressed puzzlement, for example, that § 2.03 in the 2005
edition cited Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99, prominently in the text (albeit with
criticisms and caveats), as providing the main rule, while Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
was relegated to a later pair of footnotes as merely illustrating an exception to
the Tuscarora “presumption.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005), § 2.03, at 129−30
nn. 102−03; see also Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99; Part III (discussing Tuscarora).
Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, was not mentioned at all in § 2.03 (though amply
discussed in § 2.02), and neither Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, nor Iowa Mutual, 480
U.S. 9, was discussed or even cited in §§ 2.02 or 2.03. The 2005 edition did,
however, cite Escondido (though like Dion, only in a footnote) as an example of
the canons being applied to a GFL. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005), § 2.03, at 129
n. 95; see also Escondido, 466 U.S. 765. The 2012 edition now states clearly
that “[t]he Supreme Court has long applied the Indian law canons to statutes of
general applicability” (citing my 2007 article, supra note 2), and starts with
Dion in the main text as “[t]he leading modern case taking this approach,”
followed by prominent discussion in the text of Mille Lacs and Iowa Mutual.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 123 & ns. 2−7. And the
2012 edition again properly cites Escondido as a GFL canons case. Id. at 124 n.
11. Oddly, however, Merrion—widely acknowledged as an extremely important
Indian law precedent and otherwise cited dozens of times throughout the Cohen
treatise—is still mysteriously absent from §§ 2.02 and 2.03. Merrion’s important
reaffirmation of the canons, particularly as to GFLs, continues to be strangely
invisible to many judges and commentators (as discussed further in the text).
Also, as I noted with regard to the 2005 edition, see Wildenthal 2007,
supra note 2, at 485−86; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 570, chapter 10 of
the 2012 edition continues to assert flatly that “federal environmental laws apply
in Indian country unless they interfere with tribal self-government or conflict
with treaty or statutory rights, or unless Congress intended to exclude Indian
lands from the reach of the statute.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1,
§ 10.01[2][a], at 785. The 2012 edition, just like the 2005 edition, merely cites
Coeur d’Alene (with a general cross-reference to § 2.03) to support that
sweeping endorsement of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. Id. at 785 n. 6.; see also
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113. This remains inconsistent with the reasoning of
Dion (still not discussed or even cited in chapter 10), not to mention many other
Supreme Court cases. Dion, of course, was a 1986 Supreme Court decision that
actually dealt with the application to Indian country of a federal environmental
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All four of the key Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s
applying the canons to GFLs—Merrion, Escondido, Dion, and
Iowa Mutual—were cited on point in briefs provided to the D.C.
Circuit in the 2007 San Manuel case. Merrion, Escondido, and
Iowa Mutual were also cited on point in the NLRB’s published
opinions reviewed in San Manuel.32 That did not prevent Judge
Janice Rogers Brown, the author of the D.C. Circuit San Manuel
opinion, from denying that any such cases were brought to her
court’s attention. She made the surprising claim that “[w]e have
found no case in which the Supreme Court applied this [ambiguity]
principle of pro-Indian construction . . . [to] a statute of general
application.”33
Despite the publication of my article later in 2007 pointing
out the D.C. Circuit’s error in this regard, D.C. Circuit Judge
David Tatel repeated this odd confession of inability to perform
basic legal research in his 2011 opinion in El Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. United States.34 The first time might be excusable as a
mistake. For the court to reiterate this factually false claim about
the Supreme Court’s case law, after being called on it in a
published and readily available law review article, is deeply
disappointing. Perhaps the D.C. Circuit judges should hire as law
clerks some graduates of Thomas Jefferson School of Law who

law. Dion would thus seem both to outrank and to be more on-point than Coeur
d’Alene—an earlier decision by a lower court that did not address an
environmental law! Chapters 17 and 18 on “natural resources” and “hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights,” in both the 2005 and 2012 editions, do
extensively cite Dion. But that merely underscores the oddity of its absence
from chapter 10, the leading section on environmental law in Indian country.
Chapter 10 goes on to note that, “[w]ith limited exceptions, federal
environmental statutes now specifically address the role of Indian tribes as
regulators, providing clear congressional intent that those laws apply to Indian
country.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 10.01[2][a], at 785. That,
of course, reflects proper respect for the classical Indian law canons. All the
more reason, then, to avoid needlessly suggesting the sweeping validity of a
lower-court doctrine contrary to the canons and never yet endorsed by the
Supreme Court.
32
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 467−68 & nn. 167-68, 476 nn. 193−95,
479 n. 205.
33
San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312; but see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
475−80.
34
632 F.3d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312;
but see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 475−80. Distressingly, this factually
false claim was repeated by the Sixth Circuit in its 2015 opinion deciding the
Little River appeal. See supra note 9; infra Part V.C.3.
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have taken my American Indian Law course. They can find the
cases!
Compounding San Manuel’s mistake by suggesting that the
ambiguity canon applies only to laws with a specialized focus on
Indian affairs (not to GFLs),35 El Paso Natural Gas took that error
a troubling step further by claiming the canon “applies only to
statutes” enacted to benefit tribes.36 Actually adopting such a rule
would require overruling numerous Supreme Court precedents. It
would be a deeply disruptive curtailment of the canons and
expansion of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. It is certainly important
under the canons to construe laws intended to benefit Indians in a
liberal manner, to make sure their beneficial goals are fully
achieved. But it is even more important to apply the canons to laws
that concededly (to some extent) limit tribal rights—or that may
appear silent or mostly indifferent to Indian concerns, like GFLs.
Such laws might otherwise be read to erode tribal rights more than
Congress intended. Such laws are in particular need of
interpretation through the protective lens of the canons.37
El Paso Natural Gas based its suggested narrowing of the
Indian law canons on a stunningly erroneous misreading of a 1918
Supreme Court case, Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States.38
35

See supra note 33.
El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1278 (emphasis added). What made this all
the more regrettable was that the canons did not properly apply to this case in
the first place. The court declined to apply the ambiguity canon to the Uranium
Mill Tailings Remediation and Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) (as requested
by the Navajo Nation, an intervenor in the litigation), noting that it was a GFL
designed “to protect public health in general rather than tribal health in
particular.” Id.; see also id. at 1273−76. More to the point was that the
UMTRCA did not limit tribal sovereignty in any way, and the provisions at
issue did not relate to any distinct rights of Indians or tribes. See id. at 1278−79.
The mere fact that an Indian Nation was seeking a generally available potential
benefit under such a GFL (here, cleanup of a uranium mining site) did not
provide any basis to invoke the canons. As explained by COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2012), supra note 1: “The canons will not apply when the interpretive question
is one that might be posed by an ordinary litigant and has nothing to do with the
distinct rights of Indians and tribes.” Id., § 2.03, at 123−24; see also id. at 124 &
ns. 8−9 (briefly noting El Paso Natural Gas’s mistakenly restricted view of the
canons).
37
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493 (noting well established doctrine
that Indian law canons apply “to laws designed both to benefit Indians and to
undermine Indian rights,” lack of “any logical basis for exempting laws that
appear, at first blush, indifferent to Indian concerns” [i.e., GFLs], and that any
such exemption “would be a peculiar ‘donut hole’ in the analysis”).
38
248 U.S. 78 (1918); see also El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1278, citing
Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89.
36
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The brief and unanimous opinion in Alaska Pacific was devoted to
a straightforward application of the ambiguity canon to a law
setting aside several islands as a reservation for an Alaska Indian
tribe. The Court held that the reservation included the adjacent
waters and fishing grounds and stated that “statutes passed for the
benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be
liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of
the Indians.”39 The case obviously involved a law intended to
benefit Indians and did not concern or mention any laws limiting
tribal rights. While the case reaffirmed that the canons do apply to
beneficial legislation, there is nothing in Alaska Pacific restricting
any of the canons only to that category of laws.
El Paso Natural Gas’s contrary assertion rips Alaska
Pacific out of context and flies in the face of numerous far more
recent Supreme Court precedents that have clearly and
emphatically applied the canons (including the ambiguity canon) to
laws partly or largely designed to limit tribal rights. Such laws
include both GFLs and specialized Indian legislation. Of the
leading Supreme Court cases cited above, four applied the canons
to such laws—and this is merely a small sampling: Escondido
(1984),40 Dion (1986),41 Yakima (1992),42 and Bay Mills (2014).43
As my 2007 article noted, “the [Supreme] Court has often
vigorously applied the canons even to specialized Indian
legislation designed to undermine tribal sovereignty.”44 I cited in
support of that point what is probably the most famous and
important modern example of such a case, one that Judge Brown
herself cited (among others) in San Manuel to support the point
that “ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of
Indians”45—Bryan v. Itasca County (1976).46

39

Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89; see generally id. at 86−90.
466 U.S. 765.
41
476 U.S. 734.
42
502 U.S. 251.
43
134 S. Ct. 2024; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 419 n. 14, 464 n.
162 (citing more than two dozen Supreme Court cases applying the canons to
various federal laws, many of them laws limiting tribal rights).
44
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493.
45
San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1311, citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976).
46
Bryan, 426 U.S. 373, cited in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 419 n. 14, 493
n. 250.
40
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What El Paso Natural Gas missed is that the Supreme
Court’s unanimous opinion in Bryan quoted the very same passage
in Alaska Pacific, proving that its rule can hardly be limited to the
context of “beneficial” Indian legislation.47 Bryan interpreted the
federal law commonly known as “P.L. 280,” one of the most
sweeping intrusions on tribal sovereignty enacted during the
discredited Termination Era of 1943–61. P.L. 280 extended state
criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands in several selected
states.48 It has been bitterly resented by most Indian Nations and
widely viewed as a disastrous experiment.49 Bryan strained
mightily, perhaps even implausibly, to construe P.L. 280 favorably
to tribal sovereignty, to carefully limit the law’s scope and effect.
To do so, the Court deployed both the congressional intent canon
and (quoting Alaska Pacific) the ambiguity canon.50
The Bryan Court could not have been more clear that it
viewed itself as having long extended the rule quoted in Alaska
Pacific to laws decidedly unfavorable to tribal interests.
Immediately after quoting Alaska Pacific, it stated: “This principle
of statutory construction has particular force in the face of claims
that ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian tax

47

Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89.
Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 589 (1953), codified principally at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and
28 U.S.C. § 1360; see also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 377−80; COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2012), supra note 1, § 1.06, at 91−92.
49
See, e.g., Duane Champagne & Carole Goldberg, Captured Justice: Native
Nations and Public Law 280 (Carolina Academic Press, 2012); Carole
Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997); Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 129
(noting that P.L. 280 “has been intensely unpopular with both states and tribes . .
. ever since it was passed at the height of the Termination Era,” and that “[s]tates
have resented the costs of criminal jurisdiction over territories and peoples not
otherwise subject to state taxation, and tribes have resented the consequent loss
of sovereignty and intrusion by non-Indian state authorities into their affairs”).
50
Bryan concluded that the civil-jurisdiction part of P.L. 280 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1360) did not authorize a state to tax on-reservation personal property
owned by a tribal member. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375, 393; see also id. at 387−90
(applying the congressional intent canon); id. at 390−93 (applying the ambiguity
canon); id. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89. In California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the Court held that the
criminal-jurisdiction part of P.L. 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) did not
authorize a state which allowed many forms of legal gambling to
comprehensively apply its gambling prohibitions and regulations to tribally
operated on-reservation gaming enterprises. While not explicitly reciting the
canons itself, Cabazon relied heavily on Bryan’s interpretation of P.L. 280,
which was explicitly governed by the canons. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207−12.
48
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immunities.”51 The Court noted on the same page: “What we
recently said of a claim that Congress had terminated an Indian
reservation by means of an ambiguous statute is equally applicable
here . . . .”52
Despite all this, it must be conceded that the Supreme
Court, in an otherwise narrow and obscure 1993 decision,
Negonsott v. Samuels,53 included dicta calling into question this
broad reading of Bryan and the ambiguity canon. El Paso Natural
Gas understandably overlooked Negonsott—it is very obscure
even for Indian law specialists. Negonsott held that a 1940 federal
law, the Kansas Act, which applied only to criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country in Kansas,54 allowed the state to exercise
concurrent state jurisdiction over certain crimes also within federal
jurisdiction. The Court found the statutory text unambiguous,55 and
Congress’s intent clear from the legislative history,56 and therefore
found “no occasion to resort to [the ambiguity] canon of statutory
construction.”57 Rather, the Court held, “for the reasons previously
discussed, we think that the Kansas Act quite unambiguously
confers jurisdiction on the State . . . .”58
51

Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, citing three more of its precedents: McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973), Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1, 6−7 (1956), and Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366−67 (1930).
52
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392−93. What the Court had “recently said” was that it
would not infer that Congress had terminated a reservation, absent clear
language or other evidence of congressional intent. I.e., the full traditional force
of the canons would apply. See id. at 393, quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481, 504−05 (1973).
53
507 U.S. 99 (1993); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
IN A NUTSHELL 127 (West, 6th ed. 2015) (discussing Alaska Pacific, Bryan, and
Negonsott’s dicta on the ambiguity canon).
54
Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 103.
55
Id. at 104−06.
56
Id. at 106−09.
57
Id. at 110.
58
Id.; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 6.04[4][b], at 581
(discussing Negonsott’s holding but not exploring its troubling dicta on the
ambiguity canon). Another reason why Negonsott should not be viewed as
having any importance on the broader issue of the Indian law canons is that
cases on Indian country criminal jurisdiction fall within one of a few specialized
categories where the canons have long been held not to apply with their usual
force or regularity. Another example is federal tax legislation, where the Indian
law canons may be overcome by a competing canon against unexpressed
exemptions from taxation. There are some additional Supreme Court cases
affecting Indian rights that have not applied the Indian law canons for various
specialized reasons. But none of these cases has ever endorsed or even
suggested anything like the Coeur d’Alene doctrine, nor have they suggested any
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In response to Negonsott’s (the tribal member criminal
defendant’s) citation of Bryan and the ambiguity canon, however,
the Negonsott Court offered some curiously unnecessary,
tendentious, and misleading statements. Whether the author of the
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, was being mischievous or merely
careless is not entirely clear. He was well known as an almost
relentless enemy of Indian sovereignty.59 It seems he may have
taken the opportunity of a unanimous, highly technical, and
apparently uncontroversial decision to kick up some dust about the
scope of the Indian law canons. This was the same Chief Justice
Rehnquist who made several arguments profoundly contrary to the
canons and deeply hostile to Indian rights, in his outrageous
dissent in Mille Lacs.60
Responding to counsel for Negonsott’s accurate and widely
used paraphrase of the ambiguity canon—“that ‘laws must be
liberally construed to favor Indians’”61—Rehnquist scolded: “What
we actually said in Bryan, was that ‘statutes passed for the benefit
of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed,
doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.’”62
Rehnquist went on: “It is not entirely clear to us that the Kansas
Act is a statute ‘passed for the benefit of dependent Indian
tribes.’”63
One cannot argue with Rehnquist’s last statement quoted
above. As an extension of state jurisdiction into Indian country, the
Kansas Act is exactly the kind of law (like P.L. 280) long viewed
by most Indian Nations as deeply hostile to tribal sovereignty. But
note how Rehnquist neatly skipped over the similarity of the
Kansas Act to P.L. 280, the very law subjected to the ambiguity
canon in Bryan, the very case which Rehnquist falsely—and very
ironically—scolded Negonsott’s counsel for misciting. As noted
above, what the Court “actually said in Bryan” (an opinion
Rehnquist himself joined) included some very important and
undermining of the ambiguity canon along the lines suggested by El Paso
Natural Gas, 632 F.3d 1272, or the Negonsott dicta. See Wildenthal 2007, supra
note 2, at 434 n. 59, 468−69 n. 170, 487−89 & nn. 233−37.
59
See, e.g., Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 124−35 (discussing “The
Rehnquist Era of American Indian Law”).
60
See supra notes 17−20 and accompanying text.
61
Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 110 (quoting petitioner’s, i.e., defendant’s, brief).
62
Id., quoting Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392, quoting Alaska Pacific, 248 U.S. at 89
(omitting here the second set of internal quotation marks).
63
Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 110.
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relevant additional statements that Rehnquist misleadingly ignored
and omitted in Negonsott. It was Chief Justice Rehnquist, not
counsel for Negonsott, who needed correction about what Bryan
said and held.
Rehnquist was still not quite finished. Apparently seeking
to drive a wedge between Negonsott, the tribal member criminal
defendant, and the broader concerns of Negonsott’s tribe (the
Kickapoo) and other Indian Nations, he stated: “We see no reason
to equate ‘benefit of dependent Indian tribes,’ as that language is
used in Bryan, with ‘benefit of accused Indian criminals,’ without
regard to the interests of the victims of these crimes or of the tribe
itself.”64
This was an outrageous cheap shot for Rehnquist to take. It
ignored the reality that intrusions on Indian sovereignty very often
affect both the purely personal interests of individual Indians and
the broader sovereign interests of their tribes and of all Indian
Nations—much as Bryan and the state tax it struck down affected
not just the purely personal financial interest of Russell Bryan, but
the sovereign interests of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe and by
extension all Indian Nations.65
It was also stunningly hypocritical and suggested a
disturbing racial double standard. As my 2002 article noted,
“Rehnquist, never known as a staunch defender of the rights of
criminal defendants,”66 nevertheless solicitously invoked the rights
and liberties of non-Indian defendants in writing the Court’s
infamous opinion granting non-Indians special protection from
prosecution by Indian Nations for crimes committed within tribal
territory.67 Rehnquist implicitly equated United States citizens only
with non-Indians, ignored the fact that tribal member Indians are
also United States citizens, and indifferently consigned Indians to
the very same tribal justice he deemed inadequate for non-Indians
choosing to commit on-reservation crimes. He “suggested no
concern whatsoever for their [tribal members’] rights and
liberties.”68
64

Id.
See supra note 50 (discussing holding and reasoning of Bryan).
66
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 127.
67
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), discussed in
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 126−28.
68
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 127 (emphasis in original); see also id. at
126−28.
65
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Shameful—but fortunately, as noted, these mischievous
and disturbing comments in Rehnquist’s Negonsott opinion were
clearly dicta, not affecting the Court’s holding and thus devoid of
any precedential force. For the reasons stated, they should also be
viewed as lacking any persuasive value whatsoever. We may hope
the Bay Mills Court’s unqualified reaffirmation of the canons in
2014 has laid them to rest.69
III.

THE IRONY OF TUSCARORA

The sole Supreme Court authority cited by Coeur d’Alene
to support its anti-canonical rule was a brief, passing statement in
one of the most reviled Indian law decisions of the 20th century,
the 1960 Tuscarora decision. The majority in Tuscarora held that
the Federal Power Act (FPA) authorized the seizure and flooding
of a large portion of the Tuscarora Indian Nation’s land.70 The
disputed Tuscarora statement—that GFLs presumptively apply to
“Indians and their property interests”—was an unnecessary,
alternative, and seemingly secondary ground for the Tuscarora
decision.71 The Supreme Court itself has never even cited that
statement, let alone relied upon it, in the 57 years since. Supreme
Court justices have been fonder of quoting Justice Hugo Black’s
powerful dissent in Tuscarora.72
The primary ground for the decision, set forth at much
greater length by the Tuscarora Court itself, was that Congress
69

See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030−32.
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1115, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 116; see also
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 452−54 (discussing Tuscarora); Wildenthal
2008, supra note 4, at 572−73 (criticizing Coeur d’Alene’s misuse of
Tuscarora).
71
The disputed statement, that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons
includes Indians and their property interests,” appeared in Tuscarora, 362 U.S.
at 116 (the page almost always cited on this point), and was repeated in
substance four pages later, id. at 120 (“general Acts of Congress apply to
Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the
contrary”).
72
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 466 & n. 164. Justice Black’s dissent is
famously eloquent and concluded with the memorable statement: “Great nations,
like great men, should keep their word.” Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 142 (Black, J.,
joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Wildenthal 2007,
supra note 2, at 454 & n. 124 (quoting more extensively from the moving final
page of Justice Black’s dissent, and commenting on a poignant memory that
passage always brings to my mind, from when I was first interviewed by Judge
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., for whom I clerked after law school).
70
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allegedly did in fact intend for the FPA to authorize the seizure of
tribal land—a debatable conclusion (producing a horribly unjust
result), but a classic application of the Indian law canons.73 In the
1984 Escondido decision (another FPA case), the Supreme Court
cited Tuscarora specifically with regard to the 1960 decision’s
canonical analysis of Congress’s intent. The Escondido Court
conspicuously never quoted or mentioned (nor has any other
Supreme Court case) the anti-canonical Tuscarora statement on
which Coeur d’Alene leaned so heavily, even though it would have
provided useful support for Escondido’s anti-tribal conclusion.
Escondido did not even cite the two pages on which the disputed
Tuscarora statement appeared.74
There have been exactly two relevant occasions on which
the Supreme Court (in any majority opinion) has ever cited any
aspect at all of its own majority opinion in Tuscarora. Both
citations strongly suggest the Supreme Court long ago repudiated
the disputed Tuscarora statement. The first citation was in
Escondido, exactly eight months to the day before Coeur d’Alene
was decided—but ignored by the Ninth Circuit. The second
citation was in 1985, less than two months after Coeur d’Alene.75
Beyond that, more than two dozen other Supreme Court decisions

73

See Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 111−14, and especially 118 (relying extensively
on purported evidence of Congress’s intent in the relevant FPA provisions,
including specific references to Indians).
74
See Escondido, 466 U.S. at 786, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 118 (not 116 or
120), to reaffirm that Congress intended to apply the FPA to tribal lands; see
also note 71; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 467−70.
75
See Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248 n. 21 (1985),
citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 generally (without any specific page citation) as
one of three cases that were “relied upon by [Oneida County]” to oppose the
tribal claim at issue there. The Oneida Court rejected that use of all three. One
case, it noted, “expressly reaffirmed” the canons. Tuscarora and the other case,
it stated, “do so implicitly.” Id. The Oneida Court thus rejected the idea that
Tuscarora may properly be viewed as standing for any anti-canonical principle
of Indian law. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 470−71; Wildenthal 2008,
supra note 4, at 581−82. Escondido, 466 U.S. 765 was decided on May 15,
1984, Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 on January 15, 1985, and Oneida on March
4, 1985. The third (and only other) citation by the Supreme Court of any aspect
of the Tuscarora majority opinion, in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371, 415 (1980), is irrelevant for present purposes. It had nothing to do with
how to interpret federal laws, but merely reaffirmed the point that Congress has
the constitutional power to take even treaty-guaranteed Indian land for public
use as long as just compensation is paid. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
466 & n. 165.
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since 1960 have reaffirmed the canons while ignoring the Coeur
d’Alene rule purportedly based on Tuscarora.76
Let’s be very clear about this: The Supreme Court has twice
cited and discussed Tuscarora as simply one more in the long line
of its own decisions applying the classical Indian law canons—
specifically, in Tuscarora, the congressional intent canon.
Tuscarora and Escondido are part of that very line of cases.
Moreover, in both cases the Supreme Court applied the canons to a
quintessential GFL—the FPA! They thus join the other cases we
saw in Part II, dating back 112 years, in which the Supreme Court
has applied the canons or their effective equivalent to various
GFLs. Here is the full list of all nine cases: Winans (1905), Winters
(1908), Tuscarora (1960), Merrion (1982), Escondido (1984),
Dion (1986), Iowa Mutual (1987), Mille Lacs (1999), and Idaho
(2001).77
The contrary reading of Tuscarora, as repudiating the
canons in the case of GFLs—celebrated coast-to-coast in the lower
federal courts ever since Coeur d’Alene—has sunk without a trace
in the Supreme Court’s case reports. Tuscarora, in fact, stands for
the exact opposite of what Coeur d’Alene and its misbegotten
progeny have claimed it does. And that has been clear since, at the
very latest, the same year (1985) that Coeur d’Alene was decided!
Are the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, on this
issue, operating in two parallel universes? Perhaps “Supreme”
should be put in quotation marks instead of the italics I have
intentionally used (with a touch of sardonic humor) in the previous
five paragraphs and at other key points in this article.
It remains worrisome, however, that the Supreme Court,
never shy about reversing the Ninth Circuit when it wants to (that
circuit has been something of a punching bag for the Court),78 has
allowed this bizarre state of affairs to persist for almost a third of a
century now—including what is surely the longest-running
unresolved federal circuit split on an important legal issue in
American history.79 Of course, one factor has been the reluctance
76

See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 464−73.
See supra notes 13, 29, 10, 23−26, 15, 20.
78
See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998); Wildenthal 2008,
supra note 4, at 551−52.
79
Compare Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 (holding that Occupational Safety
and Health Act applies to tribal government employers) with Donovan v. Navajo
77

115

of tribes losing in the U.S. Court of Appeals to take cases to the
Supreme Court.80 But one must be queasy about what will actually
happen when the Supreme Court finally confronts the issue.
IV. CONTINUING STRUGGLES OVER COEUR D’ALENE
We must be skeptical of Coeur d’Alene’s self-description
as embracing “three exceptions” to the purported “rule” derived
from Tuscarora. That is misleading puffery designed to portray
Coeur d’Alene as somehow moderate or balanced when it really is
not.81 Consider the third Coeur d’Alene “exception” in particular,
demanding proof that Congress affirmatively intended not to
regulate tribes.82 It is the mirror-image opposite of the classical
congressional intent canon. A tribe that can show that kind of
evidence with regard to a federal law—that Congress clearly
intended it not to regulate tribes—has no need of the protective
shield of the canons in any event, at least not in that particular
case.
The third so-called “exception” to the Coeur d’Alene rule is
not really an “exception” at all, in any logical sense. Rather, it
helps define the essential nature and scope of the rule itself. It
would be as if a law imposing a general income tax contained two
exceptions for specific types of exempted income, then added a
Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (contra). Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174 (2d. Cir. 1996), and Menominee
Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussed in Part IV),
have sided with Coeur d’Alene on this point. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4,
at 553−54 (discussing Mashantucket) and 555−57 (discussing Navajo Forest).
80
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 529−30 (discussing the San Manuel
Band’s decision not to appeal the 2007 D.C. Circuit San Manuel ruling, 475
F.3d 1306); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 586 & n. 212 (discussing the
remarkable fact that not a single one of six leading cases applying GFLs to tribes
between 1985 and 2007, including Coeur d’Alene and San Manuel, was
appealed to the Supreme Court). This trend continued from 2007 to 2015. At
least two appellate decisions (prior to the 2015 Sixth Circuit rulings discussed in
Part V) applied a GFL to a tribal or on-reservation business during that period,
on the basis of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine—Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425
(9th Cir. 2009) (applying Fair Labor Standards Act to Indian-owned reservation
business), and Menominee, 601 F.3d 669 (applying Occupational Safety and
Health Act to tribal government-owned business). Neither was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Both are discussed further in Part IV. As discussed in Part V.D,
however, this trend was finally broken with the petitions for certiorari filed in
February 2016 with regard to the 2015 Sixth Circuit decisions.
81
See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577−78.
82
Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116.
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third “exception” stating (rather obviously and redundantly) that no
tax would be owed if Congress repealed the entire law. The third
Coeur d’Alene “exception” was always a necessary and logically
implied corollary of the alleged Tuscarora rule about GFLs in the
first place. Indeed, the second (mostly overlooked) statement of
that disputed rule in Tuscarora explicitly articulated this very
point, asserting that “general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as
well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the
contrary.”83 It is impossible to imagine the rule without this
corollary. It would obviously be nonsensical for a court to apply a
federal law to an Indian tribe if it was clear from that very law (and
any related evidence) that Congress specifically intended it not to
apply.
That leaves only the first and second Coeur d’Alene
“exceptions” as having any real significance. While they may in
some sense moderate the impact of the alleged Tuscarora “rule,”
in realistic and practical terms the purported “rule” and its
purported “exceptions” operate together as a single unified
doctrine deeply inimical to tribal rights and profoundly subversive
of the classical Indian law canons.
That is especially clear with regard to Coeur d’Alene’s
“treaty exception,” which has had an insidiously corrosive effect
on Indian sovereignty in two different ways.84 First, Coeur
d’Alene’s focus on treaty rights has provided an all-too-convenient
excuse to improperly denigrate and limit the sovereign rights of
tribes that happen to lack extant treaties.85 Second, the insistence of
Coeur d’Alene and its progeny that tribes demonstrate “explicit,”
“specific,” or “express” treaty rights to escape the grip of any GFL
is “wildly out of line with” the treaty canon itself, “the original
historical bedrock of American Indian law,” given that canon’s
83

Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added); see also supra note 71. I myself
missed this interesting point in my 2007 and 2008 articles, as have Coeur
d’Alene and its progeny, the Cohen treatise, and (to the best of my knowledge)
all other academic commentators. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra
note 1, § 2.03, at 124, 127.
84
See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577−81.
85
But see Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 425−27, 438−40, 495−98
(documenting the point that treaty rights are not required for a tribe to assert
fully equal sovereign rights). Of course, the extant treaties, and the overall
legacy of the Treaty Era of 1778−1868, do in important ways provide a
collective historical and moral shield for all Indian Nations. See, e.g., COHEN’S
HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 23−24.
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requirement that treaties “be construed generously ‘as the Indians
would have understood them.’”86
In the final analysis, exactly how damaging the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine may be to Indian sovereignty depends on how
broadly or narrowly courts construe each of the first two
“exceptions.” There have been significant variations among the
federal circuits in how the doctrine has played out. My 2008
discussion of the lower-court case law,87 not comprehensive to
begin with, is now somewhat out-of-date. A full treatment is
beyond the scope of this article. Good surveys are provided in
Cohen’s Handbook and Smith’s 2011 treatise on labor and
employment law in Indian country.88
The Tenth Circuit remains the leader in defending the
classical canons of construction. The 2-1 panel opinion by Judge
Carlos Lucero in Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield
(2010),89 seemed to resolve some of the confusion left over by the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan (2002).90
Dobbs appeared to lean strongly against any expansion of the
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Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580, quoting COHENS HANDBOOK (2005),
supra note 1, § 2.02[1], at 119−20.
87
As of 2008, six of the seven federal circuits to address the issue—the Second,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—had generally embraced
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552−55. The
D.C. Circuit in San Manuel, 475 F.3d 1306 had coyly denied doing so, while
succumbing for all practical purposes. See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
474−75, 502−11; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 554−55. The 2011 El Paso
Natural Gas decision (cited supra note 34 and discussed in Part II) certainly
seems to confirm the D.C. Circuit’s de facto adherence to Coeur d’Alene.
88
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 1, § 2.03, at 124−27, and §
21.02[5][c][i], at 1334−44; SMITH, supra note 5, at 114−72. Embracing the
Coeur d’Alene doctrine does not invariably lead to rulings against tribal
sovereignty, at least where the core protection of tribal sovereign immunity from
private civil lawsuits is concerned. See, e.g., Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek
Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1322−24 (11th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming Eleventh
Circuit’s embrace of Coeur d’Alene doctrine generally); id. at 1317−18,
1321−22, 1324−25 (also reaffirming, however, citing Supreme Court
precedents, special protections for tribal sovereign immunity from private civil
lawsuits, and concluding that federal laws such as the Americans With
Disabilites Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not abrogate
such immunity, even construed in light of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine); United
States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, 862 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that an Indian tribe is not a “person” subject to suit under the False
Claims Act, and remanding for consideration of whether an on-reservation
college is an arm of the tribe).
89
600 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010).
90
276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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Coeur d’Alene doctrine and in favor of the traditional Indian law
canons.
This was especially notable and heartening since Judge
Lucero, in 2002, had declined to join the key section of the
muddled but mostly pro-canons San Juan majority opinion.
Instead, he joined a separate concurrence in San Juan by Judge
Mary Beck Briscoe. They went along with the 9-1 en banc
judgment, which upheld a tribal so-called “right to work” law
against a claim that it was preempted by the NLRA. But they
embraced the analytical framework set forth by the lone San Juan
dissenter, Judge Michael Murphy, who flagrantly misconstrued
key Supreme Court Indian law precedents and advocated a
startlingly aggressive application of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.91
Dobbs involved the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), as amended by Congress in the Pension Protection
Act of 2006, which specified that ERISA applies to certain tribal
insurance plans (for tribal employees engaged in “commercial
activities”) but not others (for tribal employees engaged in
“essential governmental functions”). Before the 2006 amendment,
ERISA expressly exempted federal, state, and local governments,
but was silent on tribal governments.92
Judge Lucero’s opinion in Dobbs adopted a broadly
pro-tribal reading of San Juan and refused to apply the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine to ERISA—albeit, rather oddly, without ever
mentioning Coeur d’Alene itself. Dobbs held that even before the
2006 amendment, “ERISA would not apply to insurance plans
purchased by tribes for employees primarily engaged in
governmental functions unless Congress expressly or necessarily
preempted Indian tribal sovereignty.”93 By contrast, Judge
91

See id. at 1200−01 (Briscoe, J., concurring, and Lucero, J., concurring); id. at
1201−10 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at
559−69. While critical of many aspects of San Juan, my 2008 article praised
some other Tenth Circuit decisions, see id. at 555−58, and noted that among the
federal circuits, the Tenth stands alone in “mount[ing] significant resistance to
the allure of Coeur d’Alene.” Id. at 555. Judge Lucero reaffirmed his 2002
embrace of Coeur d’Alene in 2005, making his apparent (at least partial) 2010
change of heart in Dobbs, 600 F.3d 1275 all the more interesting and significant.
See supra note 94.
92
See Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1278−79.
93
Id. at 1284; see generally id. at 1283−84. Judge Lucero implicitly criticized
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine, and suggested the Tenth Circuit had squarely
rejected it, stating that “[i]n this circuit, respect for Indian sovereignty means
that federal regulatory schemes do not apply to tribal governments exercising

119

Briscoe’s dissent—the same Judge Briscoe whom Judge Lucero
had joined in San Juan in 2002—construed San Juan narrowly and
applied the Coeur d’Alene doctrine (again without citing Coeur
d’Alene itself) to find that ERISA had fully applied to tribal
employers before the 2006 amendment.94
The Ninth Circuit in Solis v. Matheson (2009) and the
Seventh Circuit in Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis (2010),

their sovereign authority absent express congressional authorization.” Id. at
1283. But he never cited Coeur d’Alene by name. In a footnote, he conceded
that San Juan had drawn a distinction between a tribe’s authority as a
“sovereign” as compared to its exercise of “property rights.” Id. at 1283 n. 8,
quoting San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1199. This distinction in San Juan was merely
stated in dicta, but in fact it distinguished a tribe’s “sovereign” authority not just
from its role as “property” owner but more generally from its roles as either
“employer or landowner.” San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1199; see generally id. at
1198−99; see also Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (correctly
noting the broader reach of San Juan’s discussion in this regard, though failing
to acknowledge it as dicta); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 560−61
(criticizing San Juan’s dicta in this regard); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
518 n. 331 (same). My 2007 article discussed and criticized at some length the
artificial distinctions drawn in the San Manuel cases (cited supra note 8)
between so-called “traditional” and “commercial” governmental functions, or
between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions of governments, noting the
Supreme Court’s rejection of such distinctions in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), among other cases. See
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 518−21 (discussing Garcia); see generally id.
at 511−26.
94
Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293−96 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). Judge Briscoe noted that
Judge Lucero had reaffirmed his embrace of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine in
Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428 F.3d 966, 984 (10th Cir. 2005)
(Lucero, J., concurring), cited in Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1293 (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting). Judge Lucero’s restatement of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine in
Shivwits quoted Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1462−63 (10th Cir.
1989), noting that Nero in turn quoted and relied upon Coeur d’Alene, 475 F.3d
at 1116. See Shivwits at 984 (Lucero, J., concurring) (quoting Nero’s restatement
of Coeur d’Alene’s so-called “three exceptions to Tuscarora’s rule”). When
Judge Briscoe quoted Judge Lucero’s Shivwits concurrence, she retained his
citation of Nero but dropped his citation of Coeur d’Alene and avoided any
mention of Coeur d’Alene in her ensuing three pages of discussion and
application of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. She instead referred to “the
Tuscarora rule,” Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1294 (Briscoe, J., dissenting), and cited
other cases following Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene, see id. at 1293−96
(Briscoe, J., dissenting). As noted in the text and note 93, Judge Lucero himself
in Dobbs likewise chose to discuss and criticize the Coeur d’Alene doctrine
without citing its foundational case (he did not cite Tuscarora either), thus
creating the confusing paradox that Coeur d’Alene, though central to the issue in
Dobbs, and in fact the key bone of contention between Judges Lucero and
Briscoe, was never cited in Dobbs.
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on the other hand, appeared to double down on their longstanding
embrace of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.95
Menominee followed Coeur d’Alene’s specific holding in
applying the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) to an
on-reservation business owned by the Menominee tribal
government. Judge Richard Posner’s application of Coeur
d’Alene’s so-called “treaty exception” confirmed its especially
troubling potential. My 2008 article praised Judge Posner for
successfully “fight[ing] the undertow of the Coeur d’Alene treaty
analysis” in an earlier Seventh Circuit case.96 In Menominee,
unfortunately, it pulled him under.97
Matheson applied the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to
a tribal-member-owned business on the Puyallup reservation. That
was hardly surprising, since Coeur d’Alene remains governing
precedent in the Ninth Circuit. But Matheson provided yet a
further illustration of Coeur d’Alene’s corrosive impact on treaty
rights.98

95

Matheson, 563 F.3d 425; Menominee, 601 F.3d 669
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580, discussing Reich v. Great Lakes Indian
Fish & Wildlife Commission, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993).
97
Distinguishing Navajo Forest, 692 F.2d 709, Judge Posner’s Menominee
opinion noted specific treaty language limiting access of nonmembers of the
tribe to the Navajo reservation, while claiming in contrast that “there is nothing
like that here” with regard to the Menominee reservation. Menominee, 601 F.3d
at 674. Coeur d’Alene itself distinguished Navajo Forest on the same erroneous
basis, creating the now-32-year-old circuit split on OSHA’s application to
Indian country. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Both cases ignored
the elementary hornbook principle of Indian law that all tribes, regardless of
“specific” or “explicit” treaty language—or whether they have any treaty at
all—enjoy the inherent sovereign right to exclude nonmembers from tribal
lands. See, e.g., Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133−34 & n. 1, 144; COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2012), supra note 1, § 4.01[2][e], at 220−22; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at
578−79 (citing authorities and criticizing Coeur d’Alene on this point).
98
The court rejected any exemption from the FLSA based on the Puyallup
Tribe’s rights under the Medicine Creek Treaty because there was no language
in the treaty “directly on point discussing employment or wages and hours.”
Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435. The court cited with approval United States v.
Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 2007), which improperly asked whether
the very same treaty protected a claimed right “expressly.” Matheson, 563 F.3d
at 435; see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 580 n. 181 (discussing
Smiskin).
96
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V.

THE NEAR-MISS OF 2015–16

In the spring of 2015, three separate appeals were pending
in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits from NLRB decisions that followed
San Manuel in asserting federal labor relations jurisdiction over
tribal government on-reservation gaming enterprises.99 All three
cases were decided within the space of four weeks in the early
summer of 2015. The two Sixth Circuit cases were especially
interesting because that circuit had never previously taken a stand
on the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. The Tenth Circuit case was
especially interesting because, as discussed in Part IV, that circuit
has been notable for its resistance to that doctrine. All three cases,
perhaps especially the latter, seemed to offer the best (and perhaps
last) chance for a federal appellate ruling that might reject the
NLRB’s 2004 power grab in San Manuel,100 and force the
Supreme Court to take up the issue. But the result was a dramatic
and frustrating near-miss for opponents of the Coeur d’Alene
doctrine.
A. The NLRB’s (Strategic?) Reversal in the Tenth
Circuit Chickasaw Case
First up, on June 4, 2015, was the Tenth Circuit appeal—
which was not, however, decided by the Tenth Circuit. Rather, the
NLRB in Chickasaw Nation101 preemptively reversed its 2013
assertion of jurisdiction in the same case,102 concluding that the
1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek protected Chickasaw’s
WinStar World Casino from federal labor jurisdiction.103 That
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See supra note 9.
See supra note 8.
101
Chickasaw Nation, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (2015).
102
Chickasaw Nation, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (2013). The Board was given the
opportunity to reconsider after the Supreme Court vacated the 2013 decision,
along with many other NLRB rulings, when it held that President Obama had
exceeded his power under the Recess Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, §
2, cl. 3, in filling vacancies on the Board. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct.
2550 (2014); see also Bryan H. Wildenthal & Steven Semeraro, The Truth
About the Supreme Court’s Recess-Appointments Ruling: A Debate, THE
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538257
[https://perma.cc/6VK4-U7BD].
103
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1–3.
100
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decision effectively mooted the Nation’s appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.
The 1830 treaty does contain unusually strong and specific
language protecting the Indian Nation signatories from any outside
laws “except such as may . . . [be] enacted by Congress, to the
extent that Congress under the Constitution [is] required to
exercise a legislation over Indian Affairs.”104 It was thus not
surprising that the Board, which embraced the Coeur d’Alene
doctrine in its 2004 San Manuel decision,105 found that Coeur
d’Alene’s so-called “treaty exception” applied in Chickasaw.106
In a sense, relying so heavily on such treaty language yet
again repeats the mistake that Coeur d’Alene and so many of its
progeny have made, since it wrongly implies that tribes lacking
such explicit treaty protections are less entitled to judicial
protection of their inherent sovereignty. No tribe, not even one
lacking any extant treaty protection at all, should be subjected to
the intrusive application of a federal law without a showing that
Congress intended to so intrude upon its sovereignty, and any
ambiguities in the law should be resolved in favor of tribal
immunity.107
That being said, the NLRB Chickasaw decision deserves
praise for its analysis of treaty rights. First, the Board accurately
set forth the general nature and scope of the classical treaty canon,
with better care and attention to its historical origins than any court

104

Id. at 2, quoting Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek Between the United States
and the Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 1830, art. IV, 7 Stat. 333, 334 (hereinafter
1830 Treaty). As the Board noted, the Chickasaw Nation became in effect a
party to this treaty in 1837. Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1 n. 3, citing
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465 n. 15 (1995);
see also Convention Between the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Jan. 17, 1837
(approved by the United States, March 24, 1837), 11 Stat. 573, 575. The NLRB
also noted the possible relevance of the Treaty of Washington Between the
United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, April 28, 1866, 14 Stat.
769 (hereinafter 1866 Treaty). See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1, 3–4.
105
See supra note 8. The D.C. Circuit in San Manuel, while upholding the
NLRB decision, claimed not to “choose between” the Coeur d’Alene doctrine
and the classical Indian law canons. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315. In reality, it
took essentially the same approach as Coeur d’Alene and the NLRB. See supra
note 87.
106
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 2, quoting San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B.
1055, and citing Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113.
107
See supra Part IV(especially sources supra note notes 84–86, and text
accompanying those notes); see also infra Part V.C.2.
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decision following Coeur d’Alene of which I am aware.108 This
renders rather ironic the Board’s modest statement, opening its
analysis, that it “has no special expertise in construing Indian
treaties” and “therefore look[s] to the decisions of the federal
courts to assist [it] in determining the extent of the [Chickasaw]
Nation’s treaty rights.”109 The crucial question is to which federal
courts the Board should defer, the circuit courts or the Supreme
Court? In just two concise but richly informative paragraphs, the
Board excelled (and ignored, at least there) the entire 30-year body
of lower-court Coeur d’Alene case law.110 Thankfully, instead, the
Board primarily relied, for its general rule statement on treaty
interpretation, on two of the greatest Supreme Court reaffirmations
of the classical canons.111
The second reason the Board’s Chickasaw decision
deserves praise is that it remained faithful to the true meaning of
the treaty canon in construing the language of the two treaties on
whose meaning the decision turned. It did not require the
Chickasaw Nation to demonstrate “explicit,” “specific,” or
“express” treaty language supporting tribal rights.112 It construed
the language of the 1830 treaty in a broadly pro-tribal sense,
rejecting any implication that “Congress[’s] . . . required . . .
legislation over Indian Affairs”113 might include a broad GFL like
the NLRA not enacted with tribal concerns in mind.114
More significantly, the Board discussed the very real
possibility that an 1866 treaty with the Chickasaw might be read to
limit the 1830 treaty’s protections. Article VII of the 1866 treaty
stated that the Chickasaw “agree to such legislation as Congress
and the President . . . may deem necessary for the better
administration of justice and the protection of the rights of person
and property.”115
108

See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 2–4.
Id. at 2; see also id. at 2–3 (pt. III.1, The Rules of Construction Favoring
Indian Tribes).
110
Id. at 2–3 (second and third paragraphs of pt. III.1).
111
Id. at 3, quoting Winans, 198 U.S. 371, and Oneida, 470 U.S. 226.
112
See supra Part IV (text accompanying notes 84–86); see also supra Part
V.C.2.
113
1830 Treaty, supra note 104, art. IV, at 334.
114
See Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3, quoting and discussing 1830
Treaty, supra note 104.
115
1866 Treaty, supra note 104, art. VII, at 771, quoted and discussed in
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3.
109
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It is not difficult to imagine how most courts following
Coeur d’Alene would probably find that kind of treaty language to
affirmatively support applying a GFL within an Indian Nation.
They might easily conclude that it does not “explicitly” support
any tribal exemption from a GFL. But the NLRB in Chickasaw
took exactly the opposite approach. In proper compliance with the
classical canons, the Board noted that the 1866 treaty language did
not “explicitly” support subjecting the Chickasaw Nation to
GFLs.116
Furthermore, the Board noted that the potentially harmful
1866 Article VII did not state that the Chickasaw (or the Choctaw,
who were also signatories) “agree” to “all” federal legislation
fitting the general description of Article VII.117 An additional
point, which the Board did not mention but might have, is that
Article VII “[p]rovided . . . [that] [s]uch legislation shall not in any
wise interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, or
their respective legislatures or judiciaries, or the rights, laws,
privileges, or customs of the Choctaws and Chickasaw nations
respectively.”118 Imposing the NLRA on the Chickasaw Nation
certainly would have disrupted—as it actually has in all other
Indian Nations wrongly subjected to the NLRA since 2004 under
San Manuel and its progeny—the Nation’s own laws and
regulations governing employment and labor relations within its
own territory, including as to nonmembers of the tribe voluntarily
choosing to work there.119
Finally, it should be noted, the NLRB Chickasaw decision
is not merely an example of the Board’s claimed “discretion”—in
cases affecting tribal sovereignty—not to exercise the sweeping
116

Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3 (“The language in . . . the 1866
Treaty does not explicitly state that the Nation agrees to be subject to all federal
laws of general applicability.”). On the contrary, the Board noted, the 1866
language may be read as “compatible” with the protective 1830 language. Id.
The Board, id. at 3–4, also relied on another provision of the 1866 Treaty, supra
note 104, art. XLV, at 779–80, stating: “All the rights, privileges, and
immunities heretofore possessed by [the Chickasaw Nation] . . . or to which [it
was] entitled under the treaties and legislation heretofore made . . . shall be, and
are hereby declared to be, in full force, so far as they are consistent with the
provisions of this treaty.”
117
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 3; see also supra note 115.
118
1866 Treaty, supra note 104, art. VII, at 771–72 (first emphasis in original;
second emphasis added).
119
See, e.g., Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 429–31, 434–37, 441–42; see
also San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055.
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jurisdictional power it generally claims to have. That discretionary
restraint is an option left open by the Board’s 2004 San Manuel
decision and exercised in another ruling that same day.120 Rather,
Chickasaw “decline[d] to assert jurisdiction” because it conceded
that under the applicable treaties the NLRB simply lacked power—
even under San Manuel and the Coeur d’Alene framework—to
regulate labor relations in the Chickasaw Nation.121
For all these reasons, Chickasaw may be viewed as a
significant step back by the NLRB from its aggressive project
launched in 2004 of subjecting all Indian Nation gaming
enterprises (and perhaps most other on-reservation businesses) to
Board jurisdiction. Its analysis of tribal treaty rights seems sincere
and thoughtful. If the decision was merely a cynical strategic move
to block the case from reaching the Tenth Circuit, the Board might
easily have ruled in the Chickasaw Nation’s favor on narrower
grounds—perhaps by depicting the 1830 treaty rights as
sufficiently “explicit” to overcome presumptive application of the
NLRA.
At the same time, we cannot ignore the practical result,
which was indeed to postpone to some future case any ruling on
the San Manuel issue by the one federal circuit known to be
skeptical of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine and generally the most
sympathetic to tribal rights. Did the Board, perhaps, decide to
sacrifice jurisdiction over this one Oklahoma tribal casino, in order
to shield San Manuel from a broader challenge that might have
generated a clear circuit split? After all, we should not forget,
Chickasaw unapologetically reaffirmed San Manuel itself.122
120

See San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1062; Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp.,
341 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1076–77 (2004) (exercising “discretion” not to apply the
NLRA to a hospital controlled by several Alaska Native Nations, even though
the Board specifically found that the hospital was “not exempt” from its
jurisdictional power) (emphasis in original); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
522–23 (discussing Yukon Kuskokwim and the discretion issue).
121
Chickasaw, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 1; see also id. at 4 (concluding that
“because . . . asserting jurisdiction would abrogate treaty rights specific to the
[Chickasaw] Nation, we shall dismiss the complaint”).
122
Id. at 1, 2, citing San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, twice with approval.
Briana Green, San Manuel’s Second Exception: Identifying Treaty Provisions
That Support Tribal Labor Sovereignty, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 463
(2017), provided a thoughtful and carefully researched analysis of the
Chickasaw decision (to which she referred using the name of the tribal
government enterprise, WinStar World Casino). Green surveyed all ratified
tribal treaties for language that might prove helpful in protecting Indian Nations
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B. The Sixth Circuit: The Conflicting Little River
and Soaring Eagle Panels and the Petitions
for En Banc Rehearing
The Sixth Circuit stepped into the fray just five days after
the NLRB Chickasaw decision. On June 9, 2015, a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit decided NLRB v. Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians, concerning application of the NLRA to the Little
River Casino Resort, an on-reservation tribal government gaming
enterprise south of Traverse City, Michigan.123 Only three weeks
after that, on July 1, 2015, a different Sixth Circuit panel decided
Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB, concerning application
of the NLRA to an on-reservation gaming enterprise operated by
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.124
The decisions proved the old adage that timing is
everything, because the Soaring Eagle panel unanimously favored
rejecting both the NLRA’s application to such tribal enterprises
and, more generally, the entire Coeur d’Alene doctrine.125
Unfortunately, a 2-1 majority of the Soaring Eagle panel felt
bound, under Sixth Circuit precedent rules, to follow the Little
River panel decision released just three weeks earlier, which
upheld application of the NLRA and heartily embraced Coeur
d’Alene.126
Sharpening the drama in this unusual instance of
near-simultaneous competing panels on the same circuit, Little
River was not unanimous, but rather split 2-1 on the basic issue.
The dissenting judge in Little River wrote a powerful opinion
refuting the NLRA’s application and demolishing the premises of

from GFLs under Chickasaw’s approach. She found only four such treaties,
suggesting the limits of Chickasaw’s beneficial impact. See id. at 470–81.
123
788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015); see also supra note 9.
124
791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015); see also supra note 9.
125
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675; see also id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
126
See id. at 661–62, 675 (discussing Little River); Little River, 788 F.3d at 551,
555–56. But see Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Little River was distinguishable based
on the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty rights); Part V.C.2 (discussing Judge
White’s opinion).
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the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.127 Thus, of all six judges presiding on
the two panels, a 4-2 majority rejected Coeur d’Alene. Yet because
the unanimous second panel felt compelled to defer to the contrary
view of the 2-1 majority of the first panel, it allowed the Little
River tail to wag the Soaring Eagle.
The ultimate outcome in the Sixth Circuit may not have
been different if the Soaring Eagle panel had released its opinion
before Little River, but that at least would have forced the full en
banc court to hear and decide both cases de novo—unless it were
inclined to let stand the Soaring Eagle panel’s preferred approach.
We cannot be sure whether such reconsideration would have made
a difference.
As it happened, there were at the time fifteen judges in
regular active service on the Sixth Circuit,128 and eleven of those
judges did not participate on either the Little River or Soaring
Eagle panels. The Little River majority opinion was written by
Sixth Circuit Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, joined by senior Sixth
Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt.129 The dissenter was Sixth Circuit
Judge David McKeague.130 The Soaring Eagle majority opinion
was written by Judge Kathleen O’Malley, a visiting judge from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
designation, joined in full by Sixth Circuit Judge Bernice
Donald.131 Sixth Circuit Judge Helene White agreed with the
Soaring Eagle majority’s rejection of Coeur d’Alene but dissented
in part because, as she persuasively showed, Little River was
distinguishable based on the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty
rights.132
Thus, only four of the fifteen active Sixth Circuit judges
participated on the two panels: Judges Gibbons and McKeague in
127

Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also Part
V.C.4.
128
See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Sixth_Ci
rcuit [https://perma.cc/6WLT-WJ4B].
129
Little River, 788 F.3d at 539. The case report does not identify Judge Merritt
as a “senior” judge, but he did take senior status in 2001. See SIXTH CIRCUIT,
supra note 128.
130
Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting); see also infra
Part V.C.4.
131
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 651 & n. *.
132
Id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
infra Part V.C.2. Compare Little River, 788 F.3d at 551 (“there [was] no treaty
right at issue in th[at] case”).
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Little River and Judges Donald and White in Soaring Eagle. And
only three of those judges—McKeague, Donald, and White—
opposed Coeur d’Alene and application of the NLRA.
Both tribes petitioned for en banc rehearing by the full
Sixth Circuit, but the petitions were denied in September 2015,
with only Judge McKeague publicly dissenting.133 We may never
know how close the actual en banc vote was among all active Sixth
Circuit judges. Judges often choose not to publicly record dissents
on rehearing votes. One might tend to assume Judges Donald and
White also favored rehearing, but even if so, evidently there were
not enough additional votes. Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit
(who opposed Coeur d’Alene) was not eligible to vote on the en
banc rehearing petition in Soaring Eagle, nor could she have
participated on the en banc Sixth Circuit that would have decided
the cases if rehearing had been granted. By contrast, senior Sixth
Circuit Judge Merritt (who supported Coeur d’Alene), though
likewise ineligible to vote on the petition for en banc rehearing in
Little River, would have been eligible to participate with his active
Sixth Circuit colleagues in an en banc decision.134
The fact that there were not enough votes to rehear the
cases does not, of course, necessarily indicate how they would
have been decided de novo if all the judges, presiding en banc, had
read and heard full-dress briefs and oral arguments on the merits.
Some judges might be disinclined to vote to rehear a panel
decision but might well, if compelled to address the merits de novo
on full en banc review, reach a different conclusion in the end. If
Soaring Eagle had beaten Little River to the punch, the Sixth
133

Little River, 788 F.3d at 537 & n. * (en banc rehearing denied Sept. 18, 2015;
noting merely that “Judge McKeague would grant rehearing for the reasons
stated in his [panel] dissent”); Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 648 (en banc
rehearing denied Sept. 29, 2015; no recorded dissent).
134
En banc rehearing may only be “ordered by a majority of the circuit judges
. . . in regular active service.” 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); see also Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)
(echoing this rule and limiting the vote, obviously, to active judges “who are not
disqualified”). Rule 35(a) also notes that en banc rehearings are “not favored
and ordinarily will not be ordered unless . . . necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of the court’s decisions” or when the case “involves a question of
exceptional importance.” An en banc court in the Sixth Circuit consists of all
active circuit judges plus any senior circuit judges who participated in a panel
decision being reviewed. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); Sixth Circuit Internal Operating
Procedure 35(c), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/rules-and-procedures (under
“Rules,” click on “Local Rules: F.R.A.P., Local Rules, I.O.P.’s”)
[https://perma.cc/9WM8-SFNE].
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Circuit would either have had to accept Soaring Eagle’s rejection
of Coeur d’Alene or grant full en banc review.
C. A Closer Look at Little River and Soaring Eagle
The 2015 Sixth Circuit opinions did not dramatically alter
the existing analytical battle lines over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine,
which have been clearly drawn for decades now. But there are at
least four points worth elaborating. First, Judge Gibbons’s Little
River opinion and Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion,
though arriving at diametrically opposed views on Coeur d’Alene,
shared a curious common feature. Both went to awkward lengths,
with mixed and troublesome results, to fuse their analysis of
whether and how GFLs should apply to Indian Nations with a
distinct branch of Indian law—the Montana doctrine—dealing
with the scope of inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.135
Second, Judge White’s partial dissent in Soaring Eagle showed a
welcome sensitivity to Indian treaty rights. Third, it is deeply
troubling that Judge Gibbons’s Little River opinion—which now
speaks for the Sixth Circuit—repeated two of the worst (and
long-refuted) mistakes of San Manuel and other opinions
influenced by the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. Fourth, but not least,
Judge McKeague’s Little River dissent deserves special praise for
his devastatingly vivid and concise restatement of the argument
against what he aptly dubbed the Coeur d’Alene “house of
cards.”136
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See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–66 (1981).
Little River, 788 F.3d at 565 (McKeague, J., dissenting). A small body of law
review commentary has already emerged on the Little River and Soaring Eagle
decisions. See Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 138–42 (primarily focusing on the
Soaring Eagle panel majority’s analysis), and two student case comments also
focusing mainly on Soaring Eagle. Cristen R. Hintze, Going “All-In” Against
the NLRB: How Tribal Self-Government Lost on the River in the Sixth Circuit,
55 WASHBURN L.J. 529 (2016); Riley Plumer, Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by
Applying the National Labor Relations Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring Eagle
Casino and Resort v. National Labor Relations Board, 35 L. INEQUALITY 131
(2017). Skibine’s and Hintze’s analyses are especially thoughtful and
perceptive.
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1. Attempting to Fuse Montana and the
Interpretation of Federal Laws
Judge Gibbons in Little River embraced the Coeur d’Alene
doctrine, repeating many of its familiar fallacies.137 Her two most
egregious mistakes are discussed in Part V.C.3. Judge Gibbons
took a somewhat innovative and interesting approach, however—
though also troubling and misguided—in extensively discussing
the doctrine pioneered by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United
States (1981).138 Judge O’Malley relied on the Montana doctrine
even more extensively in her Soaring Eagle opinion, despite
favoring a different outcome.
Under Montana, as expanded by several later cases, courts
apply a rebuttable presumption that “the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe.”139 This presumption may be overcome, however,
pursuant to either of two important exceptions. The most relevant
Montana exception, for present purposes, is that “Indian tribes
retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,” notably to
“regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”140 Generations of students and practitioners
of Indian law, along with judges grappling with a wide array of
Indian law cases, have come to know this doctrine (the
presumption along with its two exceptions) as the “Montana rule.”
137

See, e.g., Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552–69, 572–85.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–66.
139
Id. at 565. In the particular context of criminal jurisdiction, a related rule
categorically rejects any surviving inherent power of Indian Nations to
prosecute non-Indians. See id., citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191. Thus, Montana
applies only to tribal civil and regulatory jurisdiction. Montana originally
limited tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers only as to their activities on
property within Indian country that the nonmembers owned in fee simple, but
later cases expanded the “Montana rule” (with its two exceptions noted in the
text and infra note 140) to tribal power over nonmembers throughout tribal
lands. See Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 135–43 (discussing and criticizing
Montana and its progeny); id. at 126–31 (same as to Oliphant).
140
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). The other exception is that
tribes retain inherent power to regulate nonmember on-reservation conduct that
“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 566.
138
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The Montana rule had not previously played a substantial
role in cases grappling with how to interpret GFLs in relation to
tribal sovereignty. Montana was not discussed or even cited in
Coeur d’Alene itself in 1985, nor in the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San
Manuel decision, nor in the 1989, 1993, and 1999 cases in which
the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine.141 Nor was it mentioned in 2002 in the leading
(dissenting) opinion advocating the doctrine in the Tenth
Circuit.142
There is a very good reason for Montana’s typical absence
(or low profile) in most cases analyzing the application of GFLs or
other federal laws to Indian Nations, whether under the classical
canons of construction or the competing Coeur d’Alene doctrine.143
The whole point of the Montana rule is that it governs the
“inherent” powers of Indian Nations in the absence of any federal
law or treaty relevant to the specific power at issue.144 It is a settled
point under Supreme Court case law that Congress has the power
to limit or abrogate inherent tribal authority over nonmembers or in
any other respect,145 even though Montana might otherwise
support such tribal authority. The whole point of the canons is to
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See Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113; San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055; Smart
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932–36 (7th Cir. 1989); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and
Construction Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993); Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v.
Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1127–30 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part
IV (especially notes 87–88) (discussing circuits which have followed the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine). As discussed below in text, Montana has been discussed to a
limited extent in some pre-2015 cases applying the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. See,
e.g., Mashantucket, 95 F.3d 174 (1996 case in which the Second Circuit first
adopted Coeur d’Alene) and Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (2009 Ninth Circuit case);
see also Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 552–54 (discussing foregoing cases
from Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits), 575 & n. 152 (briefly
discussing Montana and noting that Coeur d’Alene did not cite it).
142
See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1201–10 (10th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also supra Part IV (notes 90–91 and
accompanying text) (discussing San Juan); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at
563–69 (same, in great depth). Montana was, however, quoted and briefly
discussed by the Tenth Circuit majority in San Juan (which did not embrace
Coeur d’Alene). San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1193.
143
See supra Part II.
144
For example, a section of Montana itself, separate from the enunciation and
application of the Montana rule, discussed whether the Crow Tribe might have
power over nonmember hunting and fishing based on two treaties and a federal
statute. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557–63.
145
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196, 200–03 (2004).
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guide courts in analyzing whether Congress has exercised that
power intentionally or with sufficiently unambiguous clarity.146
Congress may also restore or expand tribal powers,
including the understood scope of “inherent” tribal sovereignty—
including over nonmembers, even outside Indian country—even
though Montana might not otherwise support such tribal powers.147
The canons should also guide courts in construing the latter kind of
federal legislation, to fulfill Congress’s pro-tribal intentions and to
resolve any ambiguities in favor of achieving Congress’s pro-tribal
goals.148
Thus, strictly speaking, the Montana rule (on the one hand)
and the application of the canons to federal laws (on the other) are
entirely separate and mutually exclusive approaches—apples and
oranges. The Montana rule only comes up to bat if there is not a
relevant federal law, and the canons can only apply to a federal law
if there is one.
But Montana does have some indirect relevance to the
problem of GFLs. Keep in mind that state laws generally do not
apply within Indian Nations—absent some federal law properly
construed under the canons to authorize state regulation or
jurisdiction within Indian country.149 Thus, when it comes to civil
146

Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, of course, offers a competing guide.
See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196, 200–05, 210; see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, § 5.02, at 391–96. Congress has expanded tribal powers over some
nonmembers in several important ways. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(upholding federal law restoring inherent tribal power to criminally prosecute
Indians committing on-reservation crimes who are not members of the
prosecuting tribe); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30 (1989) (applying federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)—which
generally expands tribal powers, even off-reservation, over adoption, foster care
placement, and termination of parental rights with regard to Indian children—to
limit ability of non-Indians to finalize off-reservation adoption of Indian child
born off-reservation); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 9.04, at 765–69
(discussing Lara and tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); id., §
11.03, at 840–45 (discussing ICWA and Holyfield). As discussed, supra notes
139–140 and accompanying text, Montana does not support tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers nor any tribal powers outside tribal lands.
148
The Supreme Court in Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, while not explicitly invoking
the canons, was careful to resolve a key disputed ambiguity in ICWA—whether
an Indian child’s “domicile” should be defined by reference to state or federal
law—in favor of a uniform federal definition designed to achieve Congress’s
clear intent to protect “the rights of Indian families and Indian communities.” Id.
at 45; see also id. at 32–37, 43–45, and 49–53.
149
See, e.g., Bryan, 426 U.S. 373; supra Part II (text accompanying notes 45–
50). There are some exceptions. For more details (not relevant for present
147
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regulatory authority over things like employment, labor relations,
health, and environmental protection within Indian country, the
two alternatives, as a practical matter, are tribal or federal
regulation.
To the extent tribes regulate their own members, it is fairly
uncontroversial that they should continue to have power to do so,
unless and until Congress clearly and intentionally intervenes to
say otherwise. But what about tribal regulation of nonmembers and
their activities within Indian lands? If by some chance, under
Montana, tribes lack authority to regulate nonmembers in a
particular situation, that would not prove that Congress has clearly
and intentionally imposed federal regulation. But it would fairly
suggest it might be a wise and desirable policy choice for Congress
to do so. On the other hand, to the extent Montana indicates that
tribes retain inherent power to regulate nonmembers in a given
situation, that would suggest far less reason to assume Congress
should intervene (or has actually done so) in that situation.
It is thus not surprising that when some pre-2015 cases
following Coeur d’Alene have occasionally discussed Montana, it
has typically been to suggest that tribes lack authority to regulate
nonmembers, either as a general matter or with regard to the
specific subject matter of whatever GFL was at issue. Consistently
with Coeur d’Alene’s own erroneous and extremely misleading
treatment of other Supreme Court precedents,150 the use of
Montana by some cases following Coeur d’Alene has been deeply
flawed, even deceptive. Two cases provide useful illustrations.
In Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel (1996),151 the
Second Circuit applied the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) to a tribal government employer. Mashantucket first
quoted Montana’s second (less relevant) exception, introducing it
in a misleading way.152 Two pages later, in a section headed
purposes), see, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 6.03, at 511–30, §
7.03, at 607–11, and § 8.03[1], at 696–717.
150
See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–81.
151
Supra note 79.
152
See supra note 140 for an accurate paraphrase and quotation of this second
Montana exception. Mashantucket stated that tribes “may regulate any internal
conduct which threatens the ‘political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.’” Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 178 (my emphasis),
paraphrasing and quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. The vague phrase “internal
conduct” (whose conduct?)—substituted by Mashantucket for the language
actually used by Montana—might easily be read to suggest that tribal regulation
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“Employment of Non-Indians,” the court quoted Montana’s
general presumption without acknowledging it was rebuttable or
mentioning either of the two crucial exceptions.153 This quotation
was offered as alleged support for the court’s assertion that the
tribe’s “employment of non-Indians weighs heavily against its
claim” that applying OSHA would infringe on tribal
sovereignty.154
Right after that second quotation (of Montana’s rebuttable
presumption), the Mashantucket court quoted a vague general
statement earlier in the Montana opinion (on page 564), that
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes . . . .”155 Montana, of course,
went on to clarify that vague general premise on page 564 by
concluding (on pages 565–66, where it set forth its actual rule) that
certain tribal regulatory powers over nonmember activities within
tribal lands are indeed “necessary to protect tribal
self-government”156—but you would never know that from reading
Mashantucket.
Thus, rather than quote Montana’s language in its actual
proper order, working up to its final, most relevant, and specific
guidance with respect to tribal power over nonmembers,
Mashantucket misleadingly quoted snippets of Montana in reverse
order, literally going backward to end up with the broadest and
least useful language (on page 564) with respect to the issue at
hand. And Mashantucket—apparently because it was inconvenient
to the Second Circuit’s preferred conclusion—simply avoided any
mention of the most specifically on-point language of Montana,
language virtually compelling the conclusion that nonmembers
choosing to enter on-reservation employment relationships with
tribes become properly subject to tribal regulation. That would be
Montana’s first exception, stating that “tribes retain inherent
extends only to “internal relations” or conduct of tribal members, see Montana,
450 U.S. at 564, whereas the whole point of both Montana exceptions is to
reaffirm tribal power over certain kinds of on-reservation “activities of
nonmembers,” id. at 565, or “conduct of non-Indians,” id. at 566.
153
Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 180, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
154
Mashantucket, 95 F.3d at 181.
155
Id. at 180, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
156
See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
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sovereign power to . . . regulate . . . nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”157
The Ninth Circuit’s 2009 Matheson decision158 also
mishandled Montana. As discussed in Part IV, Matheson applied
the federal FLSA to an on-reservation business owned by tribal
members (the Mathesons), which employed nonmembers. The
Ninth Circuit did at least acknowledge the Mathesons’ argument,
citing Montana (along with treaty language supporting a right to
exclude nonmembers), that the tribe had “a right to regulate
employment relationships with those nontribal members who
consent to employment by tribal members.”159 Matheson quoted
the same vague Montana statement (on page 564) emphasized by
Mashantucket—that tribes generally lack power “beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations.”160 But Matheson did at least proceed in proper order to
quote in full the Montana rule (with both exceptions).161
Matheson offered two reasons for applying the GFL at
issue to on-reservation employees, despite the implications of
Montana. First, the court noted that the tribe in question had not
sought to exercise any “regulatory authority over employment and
wages.”162 That’s a fair point and might suggest the desirability of
some federal regulation as a policy matter. On the other hand, a
sovereign’s decision not to regulate a particular matter at a
particular time may itself be a legitimate exercise of regulatory
authority. And all this would still leave unresolved the question of
how courts should interpret federal law to determine if Congress
has decided to exercise its regulatory power to the point of
intruding on tribal sovereignty. The classical Indian law canons
properly govern that question—that’s their whole raison d’être!—
but Matheson was bound by Coeur d’Alene as Ninth Circuit
precedent.
Matheson’s second reason for finding the Montana rule
irrelevant was a puzzling nonsequitur. The court asserted there was
“no evidence that the non-Indians employed [by the Mathesons]
157

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
Supra note 80.
159
Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435.
160
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, quoted in Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435.
161
Matheson, 563 F.3d at 435–36, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66.
162
Matheson 563 F.3d at 436.
158
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entered into any agreements or dealings with the . . . Tribe that
would subject [them] to tribal civil jurisdiction.”163 That ignored
the language of Montana that Matheson itself had just quoted,
which upheld tribal civil jurisdiction over “nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members.”164
In any event, it is absurd to suggest that nonmembers who
choose to accept employment on an Indian reservation and
regularly commute there for that purpose, are not also consensually
entering into a very significant “relationship” with the tribe in
general, not just with the specific tribal employer. Tribes are
largely defined by their membership, more so (in some respects)
than by geographical boundaries.165 If one enters into “commercial
dealings” with tribal members, one is by definition dealing with
the tribe.
Judge Gibbons in Little River discussed Montana far more
extensively than did Mashantucket or Matheson, or any other case
(to my knowledge) in the Coeur d’Alene line. Judge Gibbons cited
Montana on at least 10 distinct occasions spread over eight of the
17 pages of her Little River opinion.166 Three of those occasions
involved quite substantial discussions of Montana.167
On only one of those 10 occasions (the second) did Judge
Gibbons quote the full actual rule (with both exceptions) set forth
on pages 565–66 of Montana.168 Even there, she concluded by
insisting that the Montana rule was somehow limited by the vague
antecedent statement on page 564 of Montana (the same one
emphasized by Mashantucket and Matheson): that tribal powers
generally extend only to matters “necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.”169 Just to be clear
(though at risk of repetition), let us note again that Montana itself
clarified its statement on page 564 by concluding (with the more
detailed Montana rule) that certain tribal regulatory powers over
163

Id. (emphasis added).
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (my emphasis), quoted in Matheson, 563 F.3d at
436.
165
See generally Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and MembershipBased Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing
Vision, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
166
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 544, 545, 546, 550 (three citations), 551, 552,
553, 554.
167
See id. at 545, 546, 551.
168
Id. at 545, quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66.
169
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, quoted in Little River, 788 F.3d at 545.
164
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nonmember activities within tribal lands are indeed “necessary” in
that regard. The Montana rule specifically reaffirmed and provided
more guidance about those vital tribal powers over nonmembers.170
On all the other occasions (including the first) where Judge
Gibbons cited Montana, she emphasized its general presumption
against tribal regulation of nonmembers.171 She repeatedly cited
and emphasized—no fewer than seven separate times throughout
the opinion—that vague premise on page 564 of Montana.172 Judge
Gibbons, at one point, cited a post-Montana Supreme Court case
cautioning that the Montana exceptions should not “be construed
in a manner that would swallow the rule or severely shrink it.”173
That is a fair point, but Judge Gibbons seemed to go to the other
extreme of construing Montana’s general rule (and the earlier
statement on page 564) to the point of swallowing the exceptions
which form a crucial part of that rule.
Let’s be very clear. It is not just the author of this article
who contends that tribal powers over nonmember activities on
tribal lands are an “important” surviving part of the inherent
sovereignty of Indian Nations. The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual
(1987), decided six years after Montana, held: “Tribal authority
over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an
important part of tribal sovereignty.”174 You have one guess as to
170

See supra notes 139–40, 155–56, and accompanying text.
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 544, 546, 550 (three citations), 551, 552, 553,
554.
172
See id. at 544, 545, 546, 550 (three citations), 552.
173
Id. at 546, quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Judge Gibbons wrongly suggested that Plains Commerce “narrowed the ambit
of Montana’s exceptions.” Little River, 788 F.3d at 546. But however debatable
Plains Commerce’s specific 5–4 holding might be (I happen to agree with
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Plains Commerce at 342–52), it did not claim to alter
the Montana rule. It merely (not too surprisingly) applied that rule so as not to
support tribal jurisdiction in a context (as Judge Gibbons noted) involving a nontribal bank’s sale of a parcel of reservation land that was allotted long ago and
had passed into fee simple non-Indian ownership. See Little River, 788 F.3d at
546; see also Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 328–29, 331, 335–37. That is a far
cry from the scenario presented in Little River (and the many other cases which
are the primary focus of this article), as discussed in the text below, involving
nonmembers voluntarily entering into employment and other commercial
relationships with tribes and their members on tribal reservation trust land.
174
Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18; see also supra Part II (discussing Iowa Mutual
as one of four leading Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s that applied the
classical Indian law canons of constructions to GFLs); Wildenthal 2008, supra
note 4, at 575 (quoting this same part of Iowa Mutual’s holding in the context of
171
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the first case the Iowa Mutual Court cited to support this hornbook
principle of American Indian law—Montana (specifically, pages
565–66).175
The exact scope of Indian Nation regulatory authority over
nonmembers under the Montana rule is, of course, a debatable
issue that will vary with the facts of each case. But it is quite
obvious, as noted in my 2007 article, that “one of the scenarios
most strongly favoring [tribal power] is when nonmembers engage
in voluntary commercial or other dealings with a tribe on its
reservation—such as, say, employment or patronage at a tribal
casino.”176
Judge Gibbons in Little River, despite her extensive
discussion of Montana and despite acknowledging Iowa Mutual,177
pointing out how Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, ignored and misapplied
Supreme Court precedents in this regard); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 460
(quoting this same part of Iowa Mutual’s holding in the context of pointing out
how the NLRB’s 2004 San Manuel decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, misapplied
Iowa Mutual and other Supreme Court precedents in this regard); id. at 476
(noting that the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San Manuel decision, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055,
failed to discuss or even cite Iowa Mutual, despite the fact that it was cited and
discussed extensively in the briefs and in the NLRB opinions below); id. at 506
(reiterating the point that Iowa Mutual and other Supreme Court precedents
support tribal power to regulate nonmember activities on tribal lands).
175
Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18, citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. Iowa
Mutual also cited in support, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Merrion (1982), 455 U.S.
130. Part V.C.3 of this article, infra, discusses Judge Gibbons’s blatant
mischaracterization and misapplication of Merrion.
176
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 506; see generally id. at 459–61, 506–07 &
n. 288; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 574–75; see also Little River, 788 F.3d
at 562 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (noting that the nonmembers the Little River
Band sought to regulate “entered into contractual (employment) relationships
with the Band and are therefore properly subject to” tribal law), citing Montana,
450 U.S. at 565.
177
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 548 (citing and discussing Iowa Mutual). Judge
Gibbons mistakenly argued that the classical Indian law canons could not
possibly apply to all GFLs potentially affecting tribal sovereignty (as she
seemed to concede Iowa Mutual suggested), because “the sovereign powers of
the several states—which, unlike the sovereign powers of Indian tribes, are
constitutionally protected,” do not receive “such solicitude.” Id. at 549. That is
simply wrong on multiple levels. The courts, first of all, obviously do enforce
(with great “solicitude”) the constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty. See,
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (enforcing constitutional rule
protecting states against federal commandeering of state or local executive or
legislative officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (enforcing
constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to override state sovereign immunity,
even as to a lawsuit brought by a sovereign Indian Nation); Texas v. White, 74
U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”); see also, e.g., U.S.
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Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that “no new States shall be formed or
erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned”); id., art. V (providing that “no State,
without its Consent,” not even by constitutional amendment, “shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”); amdt. XI (constitutionalizing certain
aspects of state sovereign immunity).
The very fact that tribal sovereignty has not been held constitutionally
protected, but instead vulnerable to Congress’s purported “plenary” power over
Indian Nations, see Lara, 541 U.S. at 200; Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030–32, is
precisely the strongest argument in favor of judicial application of the canons,
to make sure Congress exercises its powers intentionally or at least
unambiguously. See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 554 (noting that the
canons “were developed precisely to ameliorate and counterbalance the
threatening potential of federal supremacy”); id. at 564–65 n. 105 (refuting an
argument, similar to Judge Gibbons’s, in Judge Murphy’s dissent from the Tenth
Circuit’s 2002 San Juan decision, 276 F.3d at 1205). The Supreme Court in Bay
Mills, reaffirming the canons, confirmed that “[a]lthough Congress has plenary
authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends
to undermine Indian self-government.” Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2032; see also
Little River, 788 F.3d at 563–64 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (discussing Bay
Mills and the Little River majority’s misunderstanding of it).
“Furthermore, even where constitutional constraints do not protect state
sovereignty,” my 2008 article noted that “the Supreme Court has enforced a
‘plain statement’ rule—exceeding the rigor of the comparable [congressional
intent] Indian law canon—requiring that Congress make its intent ‘unmistakably
clear in the language of [a] statute’ before it will be read to alter the traditional
federal-state balance.” Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 565 n. 105, quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Judge Gibbons did not acknowledge Printz, Seminole, White, Gregory,
or any of the constitutional provisions cited above. Instead, she merely cited two
cases dealing with preemption of state laws by federal laws based on Congress’s
constitutionally delegated powers. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 549. Congress’s
exercise of its delegated powers does not threaten state sovereignty in even
remotely the same way that its “plenary” power over Indian Nations threatens
tribal sovereignty. Such preemption of state laws (as long as it does not threaten
to “alter the traditional federal-state balance” so as to trigger the Gregory rule
noted above) cannot improperly threaten state sovereignty at all (if that doctrine
is properly understood), since it merely fulfills the constitutional design, which
explicitly grants valid federal laws supremacy over any conflicting state laws.
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
It may be noted that the doctrine of “plenary” power over Indian
Nations has a far weaker and more dubious constitutional and historical basis
than federal supremacy over state laws. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002);
Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 142. In any event, the Supreme Court’s state
preemption doctrine (which Judge Gibbons did not discuss in any detail)
considers Congress’s “purpose” and “express” statutory text, and indulges a
“presumption against preemption,” in a manner comparable to (though
admittedly somewhat different from) the Indian law canons. See, e.g., Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565–66 & n. 3 (2009); id. at 597–98 & n. 5 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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fundamentally failed to grasp the true import of those decisions.
Concluding Part III—the heart of her opinion, focusing on the
issue of tribal authority—Judge Gibbons asserted that Coeur
d’Alene “reflects the teachings of Montana [and] Iowa Mutual”
that “there is a stark divide between tribal power to govern the
identity and conduct of its membership, on the one hand, and to
regulate the activities of nonmembers, on the other.”178
That was an utterly bizarre assertion to make on the basis
of two Supreme Court precedents that reaffirmed tribal power over
nonmembers. The Montana rule, as we have seen, supports tribal
power over nonmembers in precisely the context presented by
Little River—where nonmembers voluntarily enter into tribal
employment on tribal lands. Iowa Mutual applied the classical
Indian law canons—most emphatically not anything resembling
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine—to uphold tribal court jurisdiction
over a civil lawsuit against a non-tribal company. Iowa Mutual did
so against a claim that such tribal jurisdiction was divested or
limited by the federal statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on
the federal courts—a quintessential GFL.179
Judge Gibbons argued that Coeur d’Alene’s “first exception
incorporates the teachings of Iowa Mutual.”180 But recall that
Coeur d’Alene’s first so-called “exception” protects only “purely
intramural” tribal self-government from Coeur d’Alene’s erroneous
presumption that a GFL will override tribal sovereignty—even a
GFL silent on tribal concerns, in the absence of any evidence of
congressional intent.181 Coeur d’Alene and most of its progeny—
including Little River—have found that first exception not to
protect tribal sovereignty precisely because (in part) nonmembers
were involved.182 Yet Iowa Mutual upheld tribal sovereignty in
precisely such a scenario. Judge Gibbons simply ignored, or failed
to understand, this basic contradiction between Coeur d’Alene and
Iowa Mutual.
178

Little River, 788 F.3d at 551; see generally id. at 544–51 (Part III of Little
River majority opinion).
179
See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11–13, 17–19; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2,
at 459–61, 490–92 (discussing Iowa Mutual); Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at
575, 585 (same).
180
Little River, 788 F.3d at 551.
181
See Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116; supra Part II (text accompanying note
11).
182
See, e.g., Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116–17; Little River, 788 F.3d at 552–
53, 555.
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Judge O’Malley’s opinion in Soaring Eagle discussed and
relied upon Montana even more extensively than Judge Gibbons
did in Little River.183 But Judge O’Malley drew the opposite
conclusion from Montana. She correctly noted that the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the Montana
rule. She pointed out, as we have already seen, that Montana’s first
exception strongly supports tribal authority over nonmembers in
the scenario presented by Soaring Eagle184—and, I would add, by
virtually all similar cases involving on-reservation Indian gaming
enterprises, or for that matter any on-reservation tribal
employment.185
As noted in Part V.B of this article, Judge O’Malley
concluded that her panel was bound by Little River as Sixth Circuit
precedent (and thus by Coeur d’Alene)—if only by three weeks.186
That makes Soaring Eagle’s extensive discussion of Coeur d’Alene
and Montana merely dicta. But it merits close scrutiny since it
drew support from three of the four judges on the two panels who
rejected the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.187
183

Part IV of Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion, taking up 15 of the
opinion’s 25 pages, was devoted to discussing whether applying the NLRA to
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s casino would improperly intrude on the
tribe’s inherent sovereignty. See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 661–75. The
introductory section of Part IV summarized the Little River panel’s analysis
(including its reliance on Montana and adoption of Coeur d’Alene). See id. at
661–62. Parts IV.A and IV.B then set forth what the Soaring Eagle panel felt
was the correct analysis, disagreeing with the reasoning of both Little River and
Coeur d’Alene. See id. at 662–75. Based on extensive discussion and dozens of
citations of Montana (more than 40, by my count, spread across 14 of the 15
pages of Part IV), Judge O’Malley explained at length why the Soaring Eagle
panel concluded that Montana was inconsistent with, and supported rejection of,
Coeur d’Alene. See id. at 661–62, 664–75.
184
See id. at 667–69 & n. 12; see also id. at 674 (summing up that “in Montana”
as in other cases, “the Supreme Court made clear that a tribe’s right to selfgovernance and its power to regulate the conduct of nonmembers extends to
consensual commercial relationships with nonmembers”).
185
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
186
See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 661–62; see also id. at 675 (Part V of Judge
O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion).
187
Judge Donald joined fully in Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion. Id. at
651. Judge White dissented in part (and, in effect, from the judgment), but only
based on her analysis of the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s treaty rights, as
discussed in Part V.C.2 of this article. See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 656–61
(Parts III.A and III.B of Judge O’Malley’s opinion, discussing the treaty-rights
issue); id. at 675–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same,
disagreeing with Part III.B of Judge O’Malley’s opinion). Judge White expressly
joined all of Judge O’Malley’s opinion other than Part III.B. Id. at 675; see also
id. at 677 (agreeing with “the majority’s conclusion that Little River is wrongly
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Does Judge O’Malley’s analysis offer a way forward that
might attract support in other federal circuits, or even in the
Supreme Court? Perhaps so. Her approach is certainly preferable to
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. It may appear to be an appealingly
moderate “compromise” approach in some ways. Even Supreme
Court justices relatively sympathetic to tribal claims, on the current
Court, have viewed Montana as a “path-marking case.”188 A
doctrine incorporating Montana analysis, however awkwardly,
might thus have some broad appeal on the Court.
But while I regret having to criticize the first and so far
only prevailing federal court opinion to indicate a preference to
squarely reject Coeur d’Alene,189 Judge O’Malley’s attempted
fusion of Montana with the proper analysis of federal laws—while
surely well-intended—was troubling and deeply problematical.
One must hope the Supreme Court will continue, instead, to adhere
to the classical Indian law canons it has so painstakingly developed
and applied over the past 185 years.190
decided but [as precedent] dictates that the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty cannot
itself carry the day”). Judge McKeague’s Little River dissent, by contrast, did
not reject Coeur d’Alene on the basis of Montana nor did he attempt to fuse
Montana analysis with his application of the classical Indian law canons. He
correctly noted that the first Montana exception supported tribal regulation of
nonmember casino employees. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 562 (McKeague, J.,
dissenting). But he discussed Montana only briefly during the course of his 10–
page dissent and generally seemed to view it as simply irrelevant. See id. at 562–
63. That is basically correct, as I would argue. See the discussion in the text and
infra Part V.C.4.
188
See, e.g., Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 343 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
189
See infra Part V.C.4 (discussing the very few opinions of any kind that have
explicitly rejected Coeur d’Alene).
190
See supra Part II (tracing the canons back to the 1832 opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall in Worcester, 31 U.S. 515. Professor Skibine, somewhat
similarly, noted that Soaring Eagle’s Montana-based approach was preferable to
the approaches in Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113 or San Manuel (D.C. Cir.
2007), 475 F.3d 1306; see Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 130–35 (discussing
Coeur d’Alene); id. at 135–38 (discussing San Manuel); id. at 141–42 (favorably
comparing Soaring Eagle’s approach), yet noted (as this article does) that
Soaring Eagle’s use of Montana was still “flaw[ed],” id. at 142. Compare
Hintze, supra note 136, at 552–56 (also discussing, and somewhat equivocally
criticizing and then praising, Soaring Eagle’s Montana-based approach).
Skibine, instead of advocating a straightforward return to the classical
canons, as this article does, proposed that GFLs affecting Indian Nations should
be analyzed under a “practical reasoning” approach derived from the work of
Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey. See Skibine 2016,
supra note 5, at 127 & n. 25, citing Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Skibine 2016, supra note
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Judge O’Malley acknowledged the classical canons and
recognized that they generally give tribes the benefit of the doubt,
citing Iowa Mutual, Merrion, and two other Supreme Court cases,
all of which applied the canons to uphold tribal sovereignty. As
reflected in the language quoted by Judge O’Malley from all four
cases, the proper presumption is that tribes retain sovereign
regulatory authority unless clearly and affirmatively divested by
federal law.191
The essential problem with Judge O’Malley’s hybrid
approach was that, by awkwardly and prematurely trying to
shoehorn Montana into the analysis of federal legislation, she
undermined that basic pro-tribal presumption. Even the way she
introduced her hybrid analytical framework was confusing. She
contended that under “Supreme Court precedent,” “to determine
whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign authority necessary to
prevent application of a federal statute to tribal activity, we apply
the analysis set forth in Montana.”192 Immediately after that
puzzling statement, instead of actually citing, quoting, or
“apply[ing]” anything in Montana, she cited and quoted Iowa
Mutual, Merrion, and two more classical-canons Supreme Court
cases, as just noted above. They in fact “set forth” the proper
“analysis” to be followed.
Judge O’Malley’s introductory statement was puzzling
because tribal sovereignty can never withstand or “prevent” the
“application” of federal legislation—if Congress has clearly
indicated its intent to override tribal power. If Congress has not
indicated such intent, then by definition (under the canons) federal
law does not limit tribal authority. It is literally impossible to
analyze or resolve that issue by “apply[ing] . . . Montana.” The
analytical focus must be on Congress’s legislation and intentions,
not on the background scope of “inherent [tribal] sovereign
authority.”
5, at 155–76. Skibine’s approach has much to commend it and at times he
reaffirmed aspects of the classical canons, e.g., id. at 162–64. My fear, however,
would be that a “practical reasoning” approach, like Soaring Eagle’s attempted
fusion with Montana, would make it all too easy for many judges to yield (and
all too difficult for others to avoid yielding) to the temptations of judicial policymaking discussed below in the text.
191
See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 666, citing and quoting Iowa Mutual, 480
U.S. 9, Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978), and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
192
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 666.
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It is important to note that even if federal law does not
apply in a given situation, it does not automatically follow that a
tribe may assert its own authority. The latter is a second and
separate analytical question, which may require further inquiry into
the often-uncertain scope of inherent tribal sovereignty. That
second question would certainly be subject to Montana analysis
where nonmembers are concerned. The problem with Judge
O’Malley’s approach was that she merged the two questions in a
confusing way. She obscured the proper canons analysis by
improperly putting Montana first, front, and center. She put
Montana’s cart before the canons’ horse.193
This became clear as Judge O’Malley proceeded to apply
her well-intended hybrid analysis to the NLRA. She correctly
stated that it was necessary to “first determine whether Congress
has demonstrated a clear intent that a [GFL] will apply to the
activities of Indian tribes.” But she then promptly derailed herself
by stating, confusingly, that “[i]f Congress has not so spoken, we
would then determine if the [GFL] impinges on” certain aspects of
tribal authority.194 If Congress has not “spoken” clearly or
intentionally enough, however, a federal law (whether a GFL or
specialized Indian legislation) would not and should not “impinge”
on tribal authority at all, in the first place. The analysis of the
federal law would be at an end, and it would simply not apply to
the tribe. That is not to suggest the tribe would necessarily have
authority to act as it wished in that situation. Any party with proper
standing could certainly challenge the extent of the tribe’s own
inherent authority, by invoking Montana.
Judge O’Malley, by contrast, seemed to believe that even if
a GFL merely appears to potentially affect a tribe’s interaction
with nonmembers, it should be presumed to apply to the tribe
unless the tribe “demonstrate[s] that one of the two Montana
exceptions . . . applies.”195 But that simply does not follow under
193

A somewhat analogous analytical confusion hobbled Judge Janice Rogers
Brown’s analysis in San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d 1306, as discussed
in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 504; see generally id. at 502–11.
194
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 667.
195
Id. Professor Skibine hit the nail on the head with his apt observation that the
Soaring Eagle “approach in effect creates a rebuttable presumption that
Congress always intends a federal law to apply to Indian nations inside their
reservations if such law has the potential to impact a significant number of nontribal members.” Skibine 2016, supra note 5, at 142.
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either the classical canons or Montana, taken properly as separate
questions considered in proper sequence. The fact that a tribe
might possibly (hypothetically) lack authority under Montana to
regulate certain nonmember activities does not mean a court
should reflexively conclude—without evidence of congressional
intent—that a given federal law (even a GFL) does apply to such
activities. To be sure, such a hypothetical lack of tribal authority
might arguably suggest policy reasons supporting Congress’s
consideration of new legislation to address the problem in a
careful, thoughtful, and intentional manner.
Judge O’Malley, despite quoting relevant language from
Merrion, did not seem to understand the significance of that
landmark precedent in the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence.
She stated that because Soaring Eagle involved an employee who
was “a nonmember of the Tribe,” “the aspects of inherent [tribal]
sovereignty recognized in . . . Merrion are not applicable.
Accordingly, unless one of the Montana exceptions [applies] . . .
the NLRA should apply to the [Tribe] . . . .”196 That makes no
sense. The central issue in Merrion was tribal power—which the
Supreme Court upheld—to tax nonmembers engaged in onreservation business.197 Merrion, like Soaring Eagle, but unlike
Montana, involved the proper interpretation under the canons of
federal legislation claimed as limiting tribal authority,198 and thus
had far more direct and obvious “application” to Soaring Eagle
than did Montana.
There is, one must concede, a certain commonsense appeal
to the notion that in the absence of clear congressional guidance,
courts should resort to the Montana framework. But embracing
such an approach would be fundamentally inconsistent with the
canons—and even more importantly, inconsistent with any proper
judicial role. It would tempt and encourage courts to undermine
tribal sovereignty by improperly engaging in their own policy
analysis—in judicial legislation, to put it bluntly—untethered by
the democratic political constraints that properly apply to
Congress. While Judge O’Malley and her Soaring Eagle
colleagues commendably resisted that temptation, this is exactly
the kind of free-form administrative and judicial policy-making
196

Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 667.
See generally Merrion, 455 U.S. 130.
198
See id. at 149–52; see generally supra Part II.
197

146

approach that led to the improper expansion of the NLRA in the
first place, in the San Manuel cases199—and eventually in Little
River.
As we have seen, the hypothetical stated above, about
possible lack of tribal power under Montana, is very unlikely with
regard to the typical scenario discussed in this article—a tribe’s
regulation of nonmembers choosing to engage in on-reservation
employment. Montana’s first exception plainly and amply supports
tribal authority in that scenario. As we have also seen, Judge
O’Malley herself correctly reached that ultimate conclusion. She
would have held accordingly in Soaring Eagle were it not for the
Sixth Circuit precedent rule that she felt commanded obedience to
Little River’s erroneous contrary holding.
2. Judge White in Soaring Eagle: A Welcome Attempt
to Revive and Contextualize Treaty Rights
Within the Broader Framework
of Indian Sovereignty
The two Sixth Circuit judges who appeared in 2015 to have
the soundest understanding of the Supreme Court’s case law on
tribal sovereignty were Judge Helene White in Soaring Eagle and
Judge David McKeague in Little River. (Judge McKeague’s Little
River dissent is discussed in Part V.C.4.)
Judge White agreed with the Soaring Eagle panel majority
“that Little River was wrongly decided, that Coeur d’Alene . . . is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,” and that the NLRA
did not properly apply to the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe on that
basis alone.200 She also agreed with “the majority’s conclusion that
199

See supra note 8; see also, e.g., Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 504.
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Judge White, while joining the relevant parts of Judge O’Malley’s
opinion, did not comment specifically on Judge O’Malley’s troubling and
needlessly laborious attempt to fuse Montana analysis with the classical canons
of construction, as discussed in Part V.C.1. One has to wonder, given Judge
White’s strong understanding of tribal sovereignty reflected in her dissent,
whether she actually embraced Judge O’Malley’s approach wholeheartedly.
Perhaps she went along merely because Judges O’Malley and Donald were not
willing to go any further in repudiating Coeur d’Alene, or because (as explained
in her dissent) the outcome in Soaring Eagle did not ultimately turn on inherent
tribal sovereignty in any event, or both.
Judge White’s dissent of barely more than two pages seemed to cover
more ground, more lucidly and effectively, than Judge O’Malley’s lumbering
200
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Little River [as circuit precedent by three weeks] . . . dictates that
the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty cannot itself carry the day.”201 But
she ultimately dissented because she found that the Saginaw
Chippewa Tribe’s rights under the U.S.-Chippewa Treaty of
1864202 protected its authority to regulate the employment of
nonmembers on its reservation and have never been abrogated by
the NLRA or any other federal law.203
Judge O’Malley’s majority opinion in Soaring Eagle
agreed that the tribe’s treaty rights have not been abrogated204 and
offered a decent recital of the treaty canon of construction.205
Sadly, however, even though Judge O’Malley generally rejected
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine (as discussed in Part V.C.1), she
yielded to that doctrine’s perversion of the treaty canon to require a
showing of “specific” treaty rights (as discussed in Part IV). Her
25-page panel opinion. Judge White’s dissent focused mainly on the treatyrights issue, as discussed in this subpart. But her most significant general
comment on Coeur d’Alene seems more succinctly in line with Judge
McKeague’s Little River dissent than with the Soaring Eagle panel majority:
That Little River and Coeur d’Alene relegate tribal sovereign
rights of exclusion to history does not justify the abrogation of treatybased exclusionary rights as well. . . . Indeed, the very purpose of the
Treaty was to operate as a bulwark against any erosion of the Tribe’s
sovereign rights that might otherwise occur. In Little River and Coeur
d’Alene, the tribes’ inherent sovereignty was curtailed notwithstanding
the absence of express congressional intent to do so. Where those
courts derived the right or authority to make such a finding is not
apparent in the reasoning of the opinions themselves, nor is it apparent
from Supreme Court precedent.
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
201
Id.
202
14 Stat. 657; see also Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 651.
203
See Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 675–76 & n. 1 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The exact scope of Judge White’s dissent is a bit of a
puzzle. She specifically stated that she joined “all but section III(B) of [Judge
O’Malley’s] majority opinion.” Id. at 675; see also id. at 657–61 (Part III.B of
the majority opinion, containing the treaty analysis with which Judge White
disagreed). Logically, given the reasoning of her dissent, Judge White should
also have dissented, a fortiori, from the panel judgment set forth in Part V of the
majority opinion. See id. at 675. Yet her statement just quoted seemed to
indicate, oddly, that she joined Part V and thus the judgment. She reiterated in
conclusion only that she “respectfully dissent[ed] from section III(B) of the
majority opinion.” Id. at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
204
Id. at 657–59.
205
See id. at 656–57.
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panel majority opinion held that the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s
“general [treaty] right of exclusion [of tribal nonmembers]” was
insufficiently “specific” to preclude the enforcement within Indian
country of a GFL like the NLRA.206
The panel majority acknowledged, but failed to really
grasp, the elementary hornbook principle of Indian law that every
tribe enjoys the sovereign authority to exclude nonmembers from
the reservation, and that—as the Supreme Court held in Merrion—
this “necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on
entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct.”207
Furthermore, this basic element of inherent tribal sovereignty not
only most emphatically does not depend on any “specific” or
“explicit” treaty right, it does not depend on support in any treaty
whatsoever.208
The panel majority twice cited the Supreme Court’s treatyrights decision in Dion (1986),209 but only for the point that
Congress has the power to abrogate such rights—a power
concededly not exercised in Soaring Eagle, making the citations
somewhat off-point. The majority ignored the fact that Dion—
consistently with the generous interpretation of treaty rights
required by the treaty canon—flatly repudiated the notion that such
rights must be “specific” or “explicit.” Dion declared that treaty
hunting and fishing rights within tribal lands “need not be
expressly mentioned in the treaty.”210
206

Id. at 661 (emphasis added); see also id. at 659–61 (repeatedly contrasting
“broad,” “non-specific,” or “general” treaty rights with “specific” or “explicit”
treaty rights, and indicating that only the latter would suffice). But see
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 577–81.
207
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144. Ironically, the panel majority quoted this very
passage in Merrion, Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 659, but failed to grasp that
Merrion illustrates the very point noted in the text following this note, that this
basic tribal right does not depend on treaty rights at all (whether “general” or
“specific”). Merrion itself involved a tribe lacking any treaty protection at all.
As the Merrion Court itself explicitly held: “The fact that the Jicarilla Apache
reservation was established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute
does not affect our analysis; the Tribe’s sovereign power is not affected by the
manner in which its reservation was created.” Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134 n. 1
(emphases added); see also supra note 97; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at
578–79.
208
See supra notes 97 and 207; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133–34 & n. 1, 144;
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 578–79.
209
Supra note 25; see also Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 657, 659.
210
Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added); see also Wildenthal 2008, supra
note 4, at 581; Hintze, supra note 136, at 556 (aptly noting that the Soaring
Eagle majority’s “fatal flaw was the misapplication of [the] Indian law canons
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Judge White, by contrast, clearly understood and applied all
these principles. Conceding sardonically that the 1864 treaty did
not “expressly state” that “federally recognized labor unions
cannot solicit on tribal land,” she bluntly stated the relevant point:
“[I]t does not need to.”211 Quite the contrary. As Judge White
noted, the treaty must be interpreted as the Indian signatories
reasonably and originally would have understood it. “To parse the
specificity of the over 150-year-old Treaty to the Tribe’s detriment
violates recognized canons of interpretation.”212 She correctly
articulated the tribal right to exclude, and that it did not depend on
specific treaty support or indeed any treaty support at all.213
As the latter point illustrates, Judge White was admirably
careful to keep treaty rights in proper context within the broader
framework of tribal sovereignty. As explained in Part IV,
overemphasizing treaty rights (important though they are) may
promote a tendency (even if unconscious) to undermine the
sovereign rights of the many tribes that lack treaties. That is a
pitfall that has frequently been overlooked (or exploited) by cases
following the Coeur d’Alene doctrine and its so-called “treaty
exception.” Indeed, Coeur d’Alene has operated as a viciously
effective two-pronged pincer attack in this regard: on the one hand,
isolating and undermining the sovereignty of tribes without
treaties, and on the other hand, undermining the generous
interpretation of treaties themselves.
Judge White concluded her dissent with an elegantly
balanced summation. “[T]he Treaty matters, and to find otherwise
suggests that the federal government’s agreement with the Tribe is
not worth the paper on which it was written.”214 On the other hand,
she noted: “It may well be that when a tribe’s inherent sovereignty
rights are broadly interpreted, its treaty-based . . . right[s] . . .
ha[ve] little work to do. But out of necessity, the treaty-based right

on the treaty language at issue”); id. at 556–58, 561–62 (criticizing the
majority’s treaty analysis).
211
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 676 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
212
Id.
213
See id. at 676–77 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She
noted, for example, that “Merrion did not involve a treaty.” Id. at 677; see also
supra note 207.
214
Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 677 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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assumes a paramount role when a tribe’s inherent sovereignty has
been judicially narrowed . . . .”215
As noted in Part V.C.1, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle
opinion was the first, and so far remains the only majority opinion
by any federal court to take a clear stand against Coeur d’Alene’s
erosion of tribal sovereignty—albeit fruitlessly since it bowed to
Little River as circuit precedent.216 It is thus all the more
disappointing that the panel majority effectively threw in the towel
when it came to the fallback tribal treaty defense. Judge White
valiantly attempted a last stand behind the treaty barricade.
3. Do They Never Learn? The Outrageous Repetition
of Errors by Judge Gibbons in Little River
In my 2007 article, I undertook the unpleasant task of
noting the embarrassing claim by Judge Janice Rogers Brown,
author of the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 San Manuel opinion, that she and
two D.C. Circuit colleagues could not find any of the Supreme
Court cases applying the classical Indian law canons to GFLs—
even though four were cited on point in the briefs filed in that very
case, three of which were also cited on point in the published
NLRB opinions under review.217 In Part III of this article, I had the
even more distressing task of noting that Judge Brown’s D.C.
Circuit colleague, Judge David Tatel, outrageously repeated this
claim in the 2011 El Paso Natural Gas opinion.218
This is not a matter of opinion or interpretation. It is a
factual reality that the Supreme Court has applied the ambiguity
and congressional intent canons to multiple GFLs, in multiple
cases. One might disapprove of these decisions, or disagree with
them, or seek to distinguish them, but they did happen.
Furthermore, for the D.C. Circuit judges to deny they were put on
notice of this reality was doubly false, leaving only two possible
215

Id.
See supra Part V.B (Little River as circuit precedent); see also supra Part
V.C.1 (text accompanying note 189), and infra Part V.C.4 (discussing the very
few opinions of any kind that have explicitly rejected Coeur d’Alene).
217
See San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; supra Part III (notes 32–
33 and accompanying text); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 475–80.
218
See El Paso Natural Gas (D.C. Cir. 2011), 632 F.3d at 1278, quoting San
Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; supra Part III (notes 34–52 and
accompanying text).
216
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and equally unpalatable explanations—intentional dishonesty or
embarrassing incompetence.
This is also not a partisan problem. Judge Brown, viewed
as a conservative, was appointed by President George W. Bush
over strong Democratic opposition.219 Judge Tatel, viewed as a
liberal, was appointed by President Bill Clinton to fill the seat
vacated by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg upon her promotion to the
Supreme Court. A total of five D.C. Circuit judges have now
subscribed to this head-in-the-sand double-denial of reality. Judge
Brown in 2007 was joined by Judge Merrick Garland, appointed
by President Clinton and famously (unsuccessfully) nominated for
promotion to the Supreme Court by President Barack Obama in
2016. Judge Tatel in 2011 was joined by Judge Judith Rogers, also
appointed by President Clinton. Judge Stephen Williams,
appointed by President Ronald Reagan, joined both San Manuel in
2007 and El Paso Natural Gas in 2011.220
I now have the still more distressing task of reporting that
Judge Julia Smith Gibbons in Little River, joined by Judge Gilbert
Merritt (bringing us to a total of seven life-tenured federal judges),
repeated this factually false claim yet again in 2015.221 This is
deeply discouraging for a legal scholar whose life work has
consisted mainly of studying the work-product of judges. Has our
present maddening and nihilistic era of “fake news” and
“alternative facts” also become one of “fake law” or “alternative”
Supreme Court jurisprudence? Leaving aside legitimately
divergent opinions about the various legal doctrines enunciated
and applied by the Supreme Court, are we unable even to agree
about what doctrines the Court has in fact enunciated and applied
and in what factual context?
Even worse, it is impossible to ignore clear indications of
conscious deception and self-contradiction in the crafting of Judge
219

See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 429 & n. 42.
See San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1307; El Paso Natural Gas, 632 F.3d at 1273;
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_District_
of_Columbia_
Circuit [https://perma.cc/6UVX-6GC2].
221
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 539 (identifying judges on panel); id. at 551,
citing San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312. The bipartisan nature of the problem
continues. Judge Gibbons was appointed by President George W. Bush. Senior
Judge Merritt was appointed by President Jimmy Carter. See SIXTH CIRCUIT,
supra note 128.
220

152

Gibbons’s opinion. Judge Gibbons herself discussed two of the
four Supreme Court cases applying the canons to GFLs—Merrion
and Iowa Mutual—that were (we may charitably assume)
overlooked by Judges Brown and Tatel in 2007 and 2011.222
Judge Gibbons acknowledged the ambiguity canon and that
(like all the canons) it “is rooted in the unique trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians.”223 But, she insisted, “it
does not undermine that trust relationship to presumptively apply a
[GFL] to a tribe’s regulation of . . . non-members where the tribal
regulation is not necessary to the preservation of tribal selfgovernment.”224 That comment was part of Judge Gibbons’s
selective misuse of the statement on page 564 of Montana—mostly
ignoring, as in this very instance, the actual Montana rule stated on
pages 565–66 of that case—and defying the teachings of Merrion,
Iowa Mutual, and Montana (among many other cases) that tribal
regulation of nonmembers is often “necessary to the preservation
of tribal self-government” and amply supported by the Montana
rule.225
Judge Gibbons’s false statement in 2015 tracked very
closely the doubly false nature of Judge Brown’s 2007 statement.
Judge Gibbons, like Judge Brown, first falsely claimed that the
cases cited by the Indian Nation at bar, to support the application
of the ambiguity canon, involved only specialized Indian
legislation.226 There is something especially insufferable about
222

For citations and discussions of Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, see Little River, 788
F.3d at 544 (two citations, though only of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Merrion);
id. at 547 n. 1 (a lengthy footnote devoted entirely to discussing how Merrion
bears on the issue of interpreting GFLs, quoting the very pages in which
Merrion applied both the congressional intent and ambiguity canons to a GFL—
see below in this subpart for an explanation of the utterly misleading and
intellectually dishonest nature of that discussion by Judge Gibbons).
For citations and discussions of Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, see Little
River, 788 F.3d at 548 (half a paragraph devoted to discussing the very fact that
Iowa Mutual applied the congressional intent canon to a GFL); id. at 550 (again
citing Iowa Mutual’s application of the canons to a GFL); id. at 551 (twice
citing Iowa Mutual, in service of what was, at best, a confused and deeply
mistaken argument that Coeur d’Alene somehow “reflects the teachings of . . .
Iowa Mutual”); see also supra Part V.C.1 (notes 174–82 and accompanying
text) (discussing these citations and discussions of Iowa Mutual by Judge
Gibbons).
223
Little River, 788 F.3d at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224
Id., citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
225
See supra Part V.C.1 (discussing Judge Gibbons’s misuse of Montana,
Merrion, and Iowa Mutual).
226
Little River, 788 F.3d at 550–51.
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such efforts to blame the briefing, by the very tribe whose
sovereignty was erroneously and unjustly curtailed, for the court’s
own incompetent (or deceptive) mishandling of governing
Supreme Court precedents. That is especially true when (as we will
shortly see) the briefing in each case actually goes far to expose
each court’s incompetence (or dishonesty).
Judge Gibbons then cited and closely paraphrased Judge
Brown’s 2007 statement, stating: “Like the D.C. Circuit, we have
found no case in which the Supreme Court applied this canon to
resolve an ambiguity in a statute of general application silent as to
Indians, like the NLRA.”227 The only material change in Judge
Gibbons’s paraphrase, from Judge Brown’s 2007 statement, was
that Judge Gibbons added the last seven words: “silent as to
Indians, like the NLRA.”
Unfortunately, that weak and ham-handed attempt to
qualify Judge Brown’s statement is the most important red flag that
this part of Judge Gibbons’s opinion was consciously and
deceptively crafted to evade the binding precedential force of the
Supreme Court’s case law on this point—in particular, Merrion.
Another red flag, mentioned above, is that Little River elsewhere
cited and discussed Merrion (and Iowa Mutual), proving that the
opinion’s author was perfectly well aware of those Supreme Court
precedents. Unlike with Judge Brown’s and Judge Tatel’s 2007
and 2011 versions of this false statement, Judge Gibbons herself
removed any possible defense of mere mistake, ignorance, or
incompetence.
In fact, the Little River Band’s principal brief in Little
River repeatedly cited Merrion and Iowa Mutual and argued that
both those Supreme Court GFL cases supported the application of
the canons.228 So did all four briefs filed by amici.229 One brief
227

Id. at 551, citing San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312.
See Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians (filed July 8, 2013, in Little River, 788 F.3d 537) at iv (citing Merrion,
455 U.S. 130, “passim” throughout, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, on six
different pages); see also supra note 32 (citing references documenting the
briefing in San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, belying the D.C. Circuit’s false
claim in 2007).
229
See Brief of Amici Curiae Chickasaw Nation et al. at iv, 3, 7, 22–23, 28–29;
Brief of Amici Curiae Navajo Nation et al. at ii, 9, 16, 18; Brief of Amici Curiae
National Congress of American Indians and White Mountain Apache Tribe at
iii–iv, 4, 6, 14–15, 24 n. 8; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Indian Law
Scholars at 3–4, 11–13, 16, 22–24, 28 (all filed July 15, 2013, in Little River,
228
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specifically cited and debunked the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 statement
and expressly cautioned the Sixth Circuit against following it,
noting that the D.C. Circuit “overlooked” two key Supreme Court
cases applying the canons to GFLs.230 The Little River Band’s
reply brief carefully discussed the congressional intent and
ambiguity canons.231 The tribe noted that the NLRB misunderstood
those canons and that the NLRB erroneously contended “that the
principle applies only to Indian-specific statutes,” which, the tribe
noted, “finds no basis in the law.”232 In short, it was simply
outrageous for Judge Gibbons to suggest inadequate briefing
somehow supported or contributed to her decision to blow past
such warnings and repeat the D.C. Circuit’s error.
Let us look more closely now at Judge Gibbons’s attempt
to qualify and somehow salvage the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 false
statement. First, it must be conceded that—read literally—Judges
Brown, Tatel, and Gibbons all qualified the scope of their
statements by limiting them to the ambiguity canon. They did not
788 F.3d 537). (I was not involved in any of the briefs in these cases.) The latter
brief, on the pages cited, repeatedly cited Dion, 476 U.S. 734, as well as
Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, all with regard to their
application of the canons to GFLs.
230
Brief of American Indian Law Scholars, supra note 229, at 28, quoting San
Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312 (noting D.C. Circuit’s failure to
acknowledge Dion and Iowa Mutual); see also supra note 229; Brief of
American Indian Law Scholars, supra note 229, at 11–12 (also citing Merrion’s
application of the canons to a GFL). All three Supreme Court cases were in fact
cited in briefs filed in San Manuel, just as they were again cited in the briefs
filed in Little River. See supra Part II (note 32 and accompanying text). All to no
avail, apparently.
231
See Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians (filed Aug. 29, 2013, in Little River, 788 F.3d at 6–7) (the tribe referred
to the congressional intent canon as “the clear-expression principle”).
232
Id. at 7, citing Dion, 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9 (specifically
noting that Dion and Iowa Mutual both involved GFLs). The tribe did not cite
Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, in this particular passage, but did so elsewhere in this
brief (and, see supra note 228, in its principal brief). Minutely parsing the reply
brief, it may be noted that the tribe did not state with perfect clarity that both
canons apply to GFLs. In referring to “the principle,” the tribe appeared to refer
to “the clear-expression principle” (its term for the congressional intent canon).
In this passage, it appeared to refer to the ambiguity canon as “the Indian
canon.” However, it argued that the NLRB improperly conflated the two canons
and described the NLRB as erroneously limiting “the principle” (perhaps both
canons combined?) to specialized Indian legislation. But that is all beside the
point, which is that the Sixth Circuit was more than sufficiently briefed about
Merrion, about the other relevant Supreme Court GFL canons cases, and what
they all stood for. It is obviously the duty of a lower federal court to familiarize
itself with governing Supreme Court precedents and to follow them.
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specifically deny that the congressional intent canon might apply
to a GFL.233 There is no logical reason, however, why the two
canons would apply differently—why one would apply to GFLs
while the other would be categorically inapplicable.234 None of
these judges suggested any reason for such a bizarre and
counterintuitive notion. Nor has the Supreme Court. Quite the
contrary. The Supreme Court in Merrion made perfectly clear that
both canons apply to GFLs.235
The logical implication of the statements by Judges Brown,
Tatel, and Gibbons, in all three cases, was that none of the classical
canons should apply to GFLs. Judge Gibbons argued that “it does
not undermine [the federal-tribal] trust relationship to
233

See San Manuel (D.C. Cir. 2007), 475 F.3d at 1312; El Paso Natural Gas,
632 F.3d at 1278; Little River, 788 F.3d at 551.
234
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 479. There have, of course, been
legitimate debates about whether both canons, or the canons generally, do or
should apply to GFLs affecting tribal rights to the same general extent they do to
specialized Indian legislation, though I have argued that they do and should. See,
e.g., supra Part II (especially note 37); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 493;
see generally id. at 484–502. Some federal laws do not implicate the canons at
all. See supra note 36. And a court in any given case might easily happen to
apply one canon but not the other. The Supreme Court, for example, has applied
the congressional intent canon to GFLs in several cases without bothering to
also discuss or apply the ambiguity canon, either because there was no relevant
ambiguity, or because the congressional intent canon sufficed to decide the case,
or both. See, e.g., Escondido, 466 U.S. 765, Dion, 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9. None of those cases even hinted that the ambiguity canon
was somehow categorically inapplicable.
But that is all beside the point. The issues under discussion are whether
the Supreme Court has in fact (rightly or wrongly) applied both canons to GFLs
(it has; see supra note 235), whether it has ever suggested that one but not the
other canon might be categorically inapplicable to GFLs (it has not), and
whether there would be any imaginable reason whatsoever to treat a GFL (or
any federal law) as categorically subject to one but not the other canon. There is
not, as noted and explained in the text above, infra note 235, supra Part II, and
in the cited pages of my 2007 article.
235
See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149–52. Indeed, Merrion applied both canons to
several GFLs (naming one in particular) as well as to at least two specialized
laws dealing with Indians. See id. at 149 (referring to “two federal Acts
governing Indians and various pieces of federal energy legislation”) (emphasis
added); id. at 150–51 (discussing 1927 and 1938 acts of Congress dealing
specifically with mineral resources on Indian lands); id. at 151 (referring
generally to “national energy policies” and related “federal law”); id. at 151–52
(specifically discussing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, an obvious GFL).
Merrion carefully applied the congressional intent canon to all of this federal
legislation, id. at 149–52, and explicitly applied the ambiguity canon to all of it
as well, id. at 152, all in service of its holding that none of it limited tribal power
to tax nonmembers exploiting mineral resources on tribal lands, see id. at 133–
37, 152, 159. See also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477–78 & n. 204.
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presumptively apply a [GFL]” to a tribe in situations like that
presented in Little River.236 “Presumptive application” would
necessarily, of course, dispense with any need to identify evidence
of congressional intent, as well as not being deterred by any
ambiguity or silence in the relevant federal law.
One is forced to speculate that the statements by Judges
Brown, Tatel, and Gibbons may have been limited to the ambiguity
canon, in order to avoid contradicting too obviously the larger
number of Supreme Court precedents (beyond Merrion) that have
emphatically applied the congressional intent canon to various
GFLs. Those cases include, just from the 1980s, Escondido, Dion,
and Iowa Mutual.237 This particular qualification did not, of course,
salvage the accuracy of these statements, given the inconvenient
existence of Merrion, which applied the ambiguity canon as well
as the congressional intent canon to GFLs.238
Judge Gibbons added the further qualification that she was
unaware of any Supreme Court case applying the ambiguity canon
to a GFL “silent as to Indians.”239 She did not offer any reason why
a GFL’s complete silence about Indian or tribal concerns, as
opposed to making some mention of such concerns, should make
any difference with regard to the applicability of the ambiguity
canon—or the congressional intent canon for that matter. It appears
that her qualification was purely and intentionally designed to
sidestep Merrion as a precedent on point—and as an obvious
obstacle to the conclusion she was determined to reach. The GFL
most prominently analyzed in Merrion under the ambiguity canon
was admittedly not completely silent about tribal concerns.240
236

Little River, 788 F.3d at 550.
See supra Part II, discussing, e.g., Escondido (1984), 466 U.S. 765, Dion
(1986), 476 U.S. 734, and Iowa Mutual (1987), 480 U.S. 9; see also supra note
234.
238
See Merrion, 455 U.S. 130, discussed in note 235.
239
Little River, 788 F.3d at 551.
240
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477. The fact that a GFL may happen
to include some minor or incidental mention of Indians or tribal concerns does
not mean it ceases to be a GFL. That does not somehow convert such a GFL into
specialized Indian legislation. The GFL most prominently analyzed in Merrion
was the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA). See supra note 235. I daresay no one
would call that specialized Indian legislation, though it did happen to include a
provision defining recoverable costs to include tribal taxes. Some GFLs, like the
NLRA central to this article, or the diversity jurisdiction statute at issue in Iowa
Mutual (see text accompanying note 241), may be completely silent on tribal
concerns. Others, like the NGPA at issue in Merrion, or the Eagle Protection Act
237
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By contrast, Judge Gibbons conceded that the
congressional intent canon did apply even to GFLs “silent as to
Indians.” She recognized that Iowa Mutual “refused to read the
statute granting federal diversity jurisdiction, which is silent as to
Indian tribes,” to limit certain tribal court remedies, because of
“the absence of clear congressional intent” supporting any such
limitation.241 Iowa Mutual involved tribal power over
nonmembers, which Judge Gibbons ignored. Her studious
disregard of that point apparently explains how she could reconcile
her concession just quoted with her contradictory suggestion two
pages later that the canons should not apply at all to a GFL
affecting a tribe’s regulation of nonmembers—because, in her
mistaken view (quoted twice above), that “does not undermine [the
federal-tribal] trust relationship.”242
Leaving aside its apparent improper purpose—to sidestep
Merrion—Judge Gibbons’s qualification about a GFL’s “silence”
as to Indians did not succeed in salvaging, in any meaningful way,
the accuracy of her version of the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 statement.
On the contrary, as noted earlier, it constitutes a red flag
highlighting the dishonest nature of Judge Gibbons’s version of
that statement.
While the key GFL analyzed in Merrion did contain an
incidental tribal-related provision, it was not that part of the law
that was alleged to limit tribal authority. Rather, it was the
overwhelming remainder of that law, silent on tribal concerns,
(EPA) at issue in Dion, may include one or more incidental tribal-related
provisions.
A tribal-related provision in a GFL (as in any federal law), depending
on its content and context, might be favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to any
given tribal-sovereignty claim. Merrion (applying both the congressional intent
and ambiguity canons) happened to view the tribal-tax provision in the NGPA as
one factor supporting its holding that the NGPA did not curtail tribal rights. See
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 151–52; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 477. Dion
(applying the congressional intent canon while not discussing the ambiguity
canon; see supra note 234) happened to view the Indian religious permit
exemption in the EPA as a crucial factor supporting its holding that Congress
did in fact otherwise intend to curtail tribal rights in that case. See Dion, 476
U.S. at 738–45; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 440–41.
241
Little River, 788 F.3d at 548, citing Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18 (statutory
citation omitted).
242
Little River, 788 F.3d at 550; see also supra notes 224 and 236 and
accompanying text. Judge Gibbons’s confused and mistaken treatment of Iowa
Mutual has already been discussed, supra Part V.C.1 (notes 174–82 and
accompanying text).
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which allegedly curtailed tribal sovereignty. And that was
precisely the most important part of the law—the tribally silent
part—that the Supreme Court subjected to both relevant Indian
law canons. So the Supreme Court has, in fact, “applied th[e]
[ambiguity] canon to . . . a [GFL] silent [in relevant part] as to
Indians, like the NLRA.”243
The Merrion Court noted the highly generalized nature of
the attack on tribal authority in that case, commenting that while
the litigants “argu[ed] that Congress,” in the various GFLs and
specialized Indian legislation discussed, implicitly “deprived the
Tribe of its authority to impose [a] severance tax,”244 they “cite[d]
no specific federal statute restricting Indian sovereignty.”245 The
Merrion Court carefully noted three separate reasons for finding
the key GFL not to curtail tribal authority. The Court, (1) applying
the congressional intent canon, found no evidence of the required
intent by Congress to implicitly divest tribal power,246 (2) found
the law’s tribal-related provision to provide further support for the
conclusion that no implicit divestiture was intended,247 and (3)
applying the ambiguity canon, held that “if there were ambiguity
. . . the doubt would benefit the Tribe.”248
Further destroying any possible excuse that might be
offered for Judge Gibbons, her colleague Judge McKeague politely
pointed out in dissent exactly how Merrion refuted her entire
approach. Judge McKeague repeatedly cited Merrion on point.249
He noted that Merrion showed “congressional silence [was]
deemed insufficient to justify”250 curtailment of a tribe’s authority,
and that Merrion supported tribal regulation of nonmembers
engaged in on-reservation business.251 He called out the only
occasion where Judge Gibbons actually discussed Merrion’s
243

Little River, 788 F.3d at 551; see also supra note 240. I am borrowing and
altering Judge Gibbons’s language here, as indicated by brackets, to make my
own point.
244
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149.
245
Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
246
Id. at 149–52.
247
Id. at 151–52; see also supra note 240.
248
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152; see also Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 476–77;
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 562–63, 566–69.
249
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 558, 559, 561 (multiple citations), 562
(McKeague, J., dissenting).
250
Id. at 558.
251
See id. at 562.
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holding, pointing out what Judge Gibbons left unclear—namely,
that Merrion rejected a claim that a GFL limited tribal authority
“precisely because the text and legislative history did not evidence
. . . congressional intent”252 to do so.
Judge Gibbons’s strange effort to evade the applicability of
the ambiguity canon, and sweep Merrion under the rug in that
regard, was pointless anyway. Even if that canon did not apply, her
evasion did not advance her argument much if at all. While the
ambiguity canon certainly does apply, in principle, to the NLRA, it
has little practical work to do in that context because of the
phrasing and structure of the law. The ambiguity canon is often
less useful in defending tribal sovereignty than the congressional
intent canon, which explains why (as noted above) there are more
Supreme Court precedents applying the latter canon to GFLs. The
congressional intent canon, which Judge Gibbons was unable to
evade, is far more significant as applied to the NLRA.253
Sadly, there is still more to the tale of Judge Gibbons and
Merrion. As noted earlier, Judge Gibbons actually did cite Merrion
on three occasions in her Little River opinion. Her first two
citations avoided the force of Merrion’s majority holding by
simply citing Justice Stevens’s dissent in that case. Her third
discussion of Merrion was in her lengthy footnote one, four pages
before her repetition of the false statement about the scope of the
ambiguity canon (refuted by Merrion, which she ignored there).254
Footnote one was appended to an important paragraph at the
beginning of Part III.B of her Little River opinion, devoted to a
discussion of “implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty.”255
Judge Gibbons leaned heavily on the disputed Tuscarora
statement discussed in Part III, suggesting that some GFLs might
be found (without applying the canons) to presumptively and
implicitly divest tribes of important sovereign rights and
252

Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
See Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 431–33, 435–36, 441, 443–45.
254
See supra note 222.
255
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 546–47 & n. 1. Judge Gibbons actually began
“reviewing the law governing the implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty” in
Part III.A, see id. at 544 (the same page where she first twice cited the dissent in
Merrion). Part III.A, id. at 544–46, focused almost entirely on Montana and
cases applying the Montana rule (where “implicit divestiture” is indeed a major
theme), which derailed and hopelessly confused her analysis of the NLRA as
federal legislation (governed by the canons), for reasons discussed in Part V.C.1
of this article.
253
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interests.256 Judge Gibbons, relying on Coeur d’Alene and its
progeny,257 ignored—just as Coeur d’Alene itself ignored—the fact
that the Supreme Court in Tuscarora relied primarily and far more
extensively on the congressional intent canon.258
Judge Gibbons then segued directly from Tuscarora to
Merrion. She claimed that “Merrion also suggests that [GFLs] may
implicitly divest Indian tribes of their sovereign power[s] . . . .”259
To give Judge Gibbons credit, she did recognize in footnote one
that Merrion ultimately upheld tribal authority over nonmembers
in that case because the Merrion Court found “no clear
indications”260 that Congress “implicitly divested the tribe of its
authority.”261 But she insisted that the ultimate and most important
point was that, while tribal power was not “implicitly divested” in
Merrion, “the [Merrion] Court’s analysis presumes that Congress
could do so.”262 Yes, Congress could do so—but on what required
showing and under what governing canons of construction? The
reference to “no clear indications” was a step in the right direction,
but nowhere in footnote one did Judge Gibbons mention the crucial
and central requirement to show congressional “intent.”263 Nor did
she mention in footnote one, or anywhere in relation to Merrion,
the requirement to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the
tribe.

256

See Little River, 788 F.3d at 546–47, quoting, e.g., Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at
116.
257
See Little River, 788 F.3d at 547, citing Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d 1113, and
many other lower-federal-court cases following Coeur d’Alene.
258
See supra Part III; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–73. Judge Gibbons
got very close to the truth. She cited the very page of Tuscarora on which the
Tuscarora Court itself summarized its reliance on evidence said to show
Congress’s intent to divest the tribal rights at issue. See Little River, 788 F.3d at
547, citing Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 118. But in her text supported by that citation,
instead of acknowledging Tuscarora’s application of the congressional intent
canon on that very page, Judge Gibbons merely stated that Tuscarora applied
the Federal Power Act to divest lands owned by the Tuscarora Nation.
259
Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1.
260
Id., quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261
Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1.
262
Id.
263
She did refer elsewhere in Little River to the congressional intent canon (not
in relation to Merrion)—for example, as enunciated in Iowa Mutual. See text
accompanying supra note 241; Little River, 788 F.3d at 548, citing Iowa Mutual,
480 U.S. at 18. Her treatment of Iowa Mutual was derailed by the problems
discussed in Part V.C.1 (supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text), just as her
treatment of Merrion was derailed by the problems discussed in this subpart.
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By transitioning directly from Tuscarora’s alleged support
for “implicit divestiture” without applying the canons at all, by
repeatedly suggesting Merrion “also” supported “implicit
divestiture,” and by conspicuously omitting any adequate
description of the canons actually and emphatically applied by
Merrion (in the very pages she cited from that case),264 Judge
Gibbons left her footnote one discussion misleadingly incomplete
(at best). Judge McKeague called out her erroneous suggestion that
Merrion somehow indicated “the Supreme Court’s willingness to
find implicit divestiture.”265 On the contrary, Judge McKeague
noted: “[T]he Merrion Court held that [a GFL] did not effect a
divestiture precisely because [of a lack of] . . . congressional
intent. Merrion . . . thus confirms traditional Indian law principles:
. . . a federal law will not be deemed to implicitly impair tribal
sovereignty simply because it is generally applicable.”266
Even worse, Judge Gibbons cited with approval Judge
Michael Murphy’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s 2002 San Juan
decision.267 Judge Murphy’s San Juan dissent aggressively pursued
an argument remarkably similar to the one implied by Judge
Gibbons’s footnote one in Little River. As Judge Gibbons’s
repeated citations suggest, Judge Murphy’s dissent seems to have
directly inspired her view of Merrion, fulfilling the fear expressed
in my 2008 article that Judge Murphy’s dissent might prove
“influential.”268 As my 2008 article explained in depth, Judge
Murphy crafted an “astonishingly misleading” argument that
Merrion was somehow consistent with the Coeur d’Alene

264

See Little River, 788 F.3d at 547 n. 1, citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149, 152.
Merrion emphatically stated and applied the congressional “intent” and
“ambiguity” canons precisely at pages 149–52, but the only clue Judge Gibbons
provided was her elliptical quotation of the reference to “no clear indications” of
“implicit divestiture” by Congress.
265
Little River, 788 F.3d at 561 (McKeague, J., dissenting), citing id. at 547 n. 1
(majority opinion).
266
Id. at 561 (McKeague, J., dissenting) (first emphasis in original; other
emphases added).
267
Id. at 547 n. 1 (majority opinion), citing San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1205
(Murphy, J., dissenting); see generally San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1201–10 (Murphy,
J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons cited Judge Murphy’s dissent three more times
later in her opinion. See Little River, 788 F.3d at 550, 551, 554.
268
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 564; see generally id. at 563–69 & nn. 105,
108 & 119–20 (discussing Judge Murphy’s San Juan dissent); see also supra
note 267 (noting Judge Gibbons’s multiple citations of Judge Murphy’s dissent).
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doctrine.269 His argument was reminiscent of Coeur d’Alene’s own
blatantly deceptive treatment of Merrion.270
Both Coeur d’Alene itself, and Judge Murphy’s elaboration
of it in San Juan, dishonestly evaded and obscured the basic reality
that Merrion strongly reaffirmed the classical Indian law canons
and applied them to GFLs. Judge Murphy’s argument that tribal
sovereignty may be “implicitly” divested by federal law, like Judge
Gibbons’s similar argument in footnote one, was a classic red
herring. It has been clear for more than 30 years that the Supreme
Court will not require an explicit statement in statutory text for
Congress to limit tribal rights.271 (If it did, that would greatly
simplify the canons.) As my 2008 article noted, if that was the
point Judge Murphy wished to make—and by the same token, if
that was all Judge Gibbons wanted to establish in footnote one—
then Merrion was hardly the best case to cite.
Why not cite Dion (1986), where the Supreme Court
actually held that Congress did implicitly curtail a tribal treaty
right?272 Perhaps because that would have made it even more
awkwardly difficult to avoid calling attention to exactly what the
Supreme Court has required in Dion and many other cases: “Any
alleged implicit divestiture carries the heavy burden of showing—
by clear and strong evidence, such as in the legislative history—
that it was also intended. And any ambiguities or doubts are
resolved against the alleged implication.”273

269

Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 566; see generally id. at 566–69 & nn.
119–20.
270
See id. at 573–79; see also supra Part II (text accompanying note 27).
271
The Supreme Court appeared to come close to such an explicit “plain
statement” rule, at least for treaty abrogation, in Justice William O. Douglas’s
majority opinion in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412–13
(1968); see also Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of
Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth”—How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
272
See Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 568 n. 119, discussing Dion, 476 U.S.
734.
273
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 568 (emphasis in original); see also id. n.
119; Dion, 476 U.S. at 738–45; Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 440–41.
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4. Judge McKeague’s Dissent: At Last! A Clear
Judicial Rejection of Coeur d’Alene!
One turns with relief to Judge McKeague’s dissent in Little
River, which was and remains an important judicial landmark.274
As we have seen, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion was the
first and remains so far the only federal court majority opinion to
take a clear stand against Coeur d’Alene.275 But it followed Little
River by three weeks, was in effect just another dissent from Little
River’s controlling force as circuit precedent,276 and was afflicted
by serious problems.277 Some might claim the Tenth Circuit as
having rejected Coeur d’Alene, but unfortunately, it has been less
than clear.278 While the Supreme Court itself has never yet
endorsed Coeur d’Alene,279 and I have strongly argued that
numerous Supreme Court opinions both before and after Coeur
d’Alene have implicitly contradicted that case’s reasoning and
fundamental premises, the Supreme Court too has yet to explicitly
reject Coeur d’Alene.280
Indeed, before June 2015 only a single solitary opinion,
either majority or dissenting, issued by any adjudicative body or
member thereof, had ever specifically and unequivocally rejected
the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. That would be the powerful dissent by
National Labor Relations Board Member Peter Schaumber in the
NLRB’s 2004 San Manuel decision.281 The total number of
274

Little River, 788 F.3d at 556–65 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
See supra Part V.C.1 (text accompanying note 189); see also supra Part
V.C.2 (text accompanying note 216).
276
See supra Part V.B.
277
See supra Part V.C.1.
278
See San Juan (10th Cir. 2002), 276 F.3d 1186, discussed in Part IV; see also
Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 555–69 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s very
mixed record overall on Coeur d’Alene, in San Juan and other cases); Dobbs
(10th Cir. 2010), 600 F.3d 1275, discussed in Part IV (seeming on the whole to
implicitly reject the Coeur d’Alene approach, but without ever citing it by
name).
279
In fact, Coeur d’Alene has never even been cited in any Supreme Court
opinion.
280
See generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4,
and of course the present article.
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San Manuel (NLRB 2004), 341 N.L.R.B. at 1065–74 (Schaumber, Member,
dissenting), discussed and praised extensively in Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2,
e.g., at 415–16 & n. 4, 506–07, 517. Schaumber served on the NLRB from 2002
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published opinions rejecting Coeur d’Alene suddenly quadrupled
to four—though with frustratingly little ultimate effect—within
just the three-week period between June 9 and July 1, 2015. Added
to Schaumber’s dissent, we now have Judge McKeague’s Little
River dissent, Judge O’Malley’s Soaring Eagle opinion, and Judge
White’s Soaring Eagle dissent. Judge White’s opinion, like Judge
McKeague’s, was powerful and praiseworthy, but also quite brief
and devoted mainly to the treaty-rights issue rather than to Coeur
d’Alene.282
Judge Gibbons spent 17 pages of the Federal Reporter
adding to the mountainous pile of misguided confusion and
derogation of the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence
perpetrated over the past 32 years by lower courts (and
administrative agencies like the NLRB) following Coeur d’Alene.
Judge O’Malley spent 25 pages entangling both the classical
canons and Coeur d’Alene with the Montana doctrine (which
Judge Gibbons also did).283
Judge McKeague’s nine-page dissent, less than one fourth
as long as that combined total of 42 pages, concisely refuted 32
years of error by dozens of his lower-federal-court colleagues. It is
frustrating, to put it mildly, that a majority of his Sixth Circuit
colleagues spurned his effort to follow, instead, 183 years of
Supreme Court Indian jurisprudence.284 As he stated:
The sheer length of the majority’s opinion,
to resolve the single jurisdictional issue before us,
betrays its error. Under governing law, the question
presented is really quite simple. Not content with
the simple answer, the majority strives mightily to
justify a different approach. In the process, [it]
contribute[s] to a judicial remaking of the law that

Board,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chairs_of_the_National_Labor_Relations_
Board [https://perma.cc/GKV8-YQDU]; see also http://www.fedsoc.org/experts/detail/peter-schaumber [https://perma.cc/JZ98-9YL6].
282
See supra Part V.C.2.
283
See supra Parts V.C.1 and 3.
284
See supra Part II (tracing the classical Indian law canons back to the 1832
opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester, 31 U.S. 515).
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is authorized neither by Congress nor the Supreme
Court.285
The peroration of Judge McKeague’s dissent aptly charted
the insidious cancer-like growth of the Coeur d’Alene doctrine. I
refuse henceforth to continue calling it the “Tuscarora” or
“Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene” doctrine. That is simply a misnomer.
It is purely a lower-court “doctrine,” invented mostly out of thin
air, with remarkable intellectual dishonesty, by a single three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit in 1985.286 While the Supreme Court
was certainly guilty of a major injustice in its specific decision in
Tuscarora—and of a mistaken and inadvisable passing comment
out of line with the primary thrust of its own, then-128-year-old,
now-185-year-old Indian jurisprudence—Tuscarora itself relied
primarily and extensively on one of the classical Indian law
canons. And the Supreme Court itself never developed or endorsed
any “doctrine” based on that passing comment, and indeed, has
implicitly (repeatedly) repudiated it, during the 57 years since
Tuscarora.287
As Judge McKeague concluded in Little River:
How does one statement . . . in a 1960
Supreme Court opinion [Tuscarora], grow into a
“doctrine,” contrary to traditional principles of
Indian law . . . ? It starts with litigants urging lower
courts to . . . exten[d] the reach of federal law. Once
one court agrees and . . . invents its own exceptions,
other courts find it convenient to follow suit. Why
not? It’s a handy standard, and other courts are
using it without disastrous consequences. And so it
begins. Then the alert federal agency, sensing a shift
in momentum and judicial receptivity to expansion
of regulatory power, seizes the opportunity and
completely inverts its preexisting approach . . . .
But it’s also a house of cards. It should—
and does—collapse when we notice [that] . . . the
“doctrine” is exactly 180-degrees backward. . . .
285

Little River, 788 F.3d at 556 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., supra Parts II–III; Wildenthal 2008, supra note 4, at 572–81.
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286

166

Our adding to, rather than blowing down, the house
of cards at once usurps Congress’s power, ignores
Supreme Court precedent . . . and, not least of all,
impermissibly intrudes on tribal sovereignty.288
D. The Unsuccessful Petitions for Supreme Court
Review
The main practical significance of Little River and Soaring
Eagle is that we now have two federal circuits—the Sixth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit in San Manuel—that have squarely upheld the
application of the NLRA to on-reservation employment by Indian
Nation governments.
The Ninth Circuit has never squarely ruled on this issue,
but as the circuit that gave us Coeur d’Alene itself, there seems
little doubt that it should be counted as a third circuit almost
certainly aligned with this view. While the San Manuel Band
understandably sought review of the 2004 NLRB decision in the
D.C. Circuit rather than the Ninth Circuit, San Manuel is located
within the Ninth Circuit.289 Like many other Indian Nations in the
Ninth Circuit operating gaming enterprises (mostly in California),
San Manuel has been subjected to NLRB jurisdiction for well over
a decade now. Even before 2004, the Ninth Circuit had strongly
hinted that it thought the NLRA applied to tribal government
enterprises.290
Opposing the Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits with regard to
the NLRA, the Tenth Circuit has resisted the NLRA’s onreservation application, as well as (to some extent) the Coeur
d’Alene doctrine generally. As discussed in Part IV, the Tenth
Circuit in San Juan (2002) held that the NLRA did not preempt a
tribe’s sovereign power (analogous to that of a state) to enact a socalled “right to work” law. San Juan, however, specifically
distinguished and seemed to reserve for future decision the issue of
288
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2007), 475 F.3d 1306; see generally Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2.
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See NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir.
2003) (upholding enforcement of NLRB subpoenas against off-reservation
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expressly not deciding jurisdictional issue); Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at
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the NLRA’s application to a tribal government acting in its
capacity as an employer.291
It is difficult to disentangle the two issues, since Indian
Nations (just like federal, state, and local governments) not only
employ workers directly, they also regulate employment and labor
relations in their sovereign legislative and regulatory capacities—
including in their government-owned enterprises. For this very
reason, Smith’s 2011 treatise urged Indian Nations to do more to
flex their own sovereign legislative and regulatory powers, rather
than just arguing that their practices as government employers are
exempt from federal regulation.292
Given this background, one might have thought that when
the Little River Band and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe petitioned
the Supreme Court to review the Little River and Soaring Eagle
decisions, the Court would have jumped at the chance to resolve
this circuit split. A related circuit split—between the Tenth Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coeur d’Alene itself—has
persisted for more than 32 years now over the application of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to tribal government
employers.293 The tribal decisions to appeal in Little River and
Soaring Eagle broke with a long pattern of Indian Nations
choosing not to appeal adverse Coeur d’Alene-era decisions
upholding the application of GFLs within Indian Country.294 A
Supreme Court decision in the Sixth Circuit NLRA cases could
and should have resolved both circuit splits mentioned above.
Resolving such divisions among the lower federal courts is, after
all, supposed to be one of the Supreme Court’s main jobs.
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“proprietary” vs. “sovereign” distinction with regard to tribe’s authority as an
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Timing, however, once again may have played a crucial
role in the Little River and Soaring Eagle litigation—perhaps again
affecting, as in June 2015, this entire area of American Indian law.
The Little River and Soaring Eagle petitions for certiorari were
filed on February 12, 2016.295 The very next day, Justice Antonin
Scalia died, reducing the Supreme Court to an eight-justice
bench.296 The Court appeared, as a result, to deliberately avoid
taking on controversial and hotly contested cases in which it might
have ended up deadlocked four-to-four. Many of the Court’s
decisions in 2016 and 2017 seemed to reflect this cautious
approach.297 Perhaps partly as a result, the Court denied certiorari
in both Little River and Soaring Eagle—without further comment
or recorded dissent—on June 27, 2016.298 A denial of certiorari
295
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does not necessarily indicate any view of the merits of the decision
below and does not in itself have any precedential effect. Only
time and future litigation will tell if the Supreme Court’s decision
to abstain did perhaps reflect its approval of, or acquiescence in,
the 32-year-long Coeur d’Alene saga.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, despite frequently disappointing
Indian sovereignty advocates, still has the capacity to deliver
surprising victories for Indian Nations. That said, things were
looking bleak going into 2014. The last major Supreme Court
decision clearly reaffirming the classical Indian law canons had
been Mille Lacs in 1999. Mille Lacs was a 5-4 decision, almost a
generation old by 2014 and receding into the past millennium.299
And it was written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who retired in
2006. She was effectively replaced as the Court’s “swing vote” by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who served on the Ninth Circuit panel
that provided the foundation for Coeur d’Alene, joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s outrageous dissent in Mille Lacs,300 and wrote
majority opinions like Duro v. Reina.301 In cases like Carcieri v.
include them in the scope of that law in the first place. The NLRB’s effort to
argue that an episode in Congress in 1999-2000 indicated an understanding that
tribes were already subject to the NLRA was deceptive and ill-founded. See
Wildenthal 2007, supra note 2, at 445–52. As Green aptly noted: “While a
legislative remedy could provide heightened clarity for tribes in the present day,
it could also be quickly eroded by subsequent turns in Congressional
perspective. This could lead to uncertainty similar to that now created by
conflicting judicial . . . opinions.” Green, supra note 122, at 482.
299
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300
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495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also Wildenthal 2002, supra note 4, at 128–31
(discussing Duro, which held that tribes lacked authority to prosecute
nonmembers for on-reservation crimes, even when the alleged offenders were
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Salazar (2009),302 and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013),303 it
seemed like most of the justices had simply forgotten the canons.
But then Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in the
2014 Bay Mills decision, reaffirming the sweeping scope of tribal
sovereign immunity against most civil lawsuits. Unlike the 1998
Kiowa case, in which Kennedy had reaffirmed the tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine while seeming to disparage it as much as
possible (with no justice really defending it),304 Justice Elena
Kagan’s opinion of the Court in Bay Mills, and especially Justice
Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence, defended its value in more than
merely precedential terms.305 Best of all, as discussed in Part II, the
Bay Mills Court’s emphatic restatement of the “enduring” Indian
law canons cited Dion and Iowa Mutual, two cases that applied the
classical canons to GFLs.306 And yet—Bay Mills, like Mille Lacs,
was decided 5-4.307
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit’s fierce embrace of Coeur
d’Alene has not mellowed. In January 2017, in Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau v. Great Plains Lending, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010
(CFPA) was a GFL that applied to tribal businesses.308 Several
tribal government-owned enterprises, citing the Supreme Court’s
unanimous view in the 1992 Yakima case,309 argued that the
ambiguity canon should be applied to the CFPA, as to all federal
302
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laws, to find it presumptively inapplicable. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed. The Great Plains panel politely acknowledged Yakima,
and a 1985 Supreme Court decision also cited by the tribes,310 but
with jaw-dropping chutzpah simply declined to follow them.
“Nevertheless,” the Ninth Circuit stated, “we have
repudiated this presumption”—the Supreme Court’s presumption,
mind you, which the Ninth Circuit had just quoted from Yakima—
“in the face of our governing precedent.”311 As the panel promptly
made clear, what it meant by “our” precedent was Coeur d’Alene.
Apparently, United States Supreme Court precedents, in this area,
do not always enjoy primacy in the Ninth Circuit. To follow the
cited Supreme Court precedents, the Ninth Circuit explained,
“would be effectively to overrule” Coeur d’Alene, “which of
course this panel cannot do.”312 The Ninth Circuit panel did not
favor us with an explanation of why it felt it could defy two
Supreme Court precedents.
The January 1985 Coeur d’Alene panel decision predated
the June 1985 Supreme Court decision cited in Great Plains by
five months, and the Yakima decision by seven years almost to the
day.313 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in 2017 (along with several sister
circuits314) continues to follow its own 1985 three-judge panel
decision in defiance of the contrary teachings of later decisions by
a higher court—the United States Supreme Court—a court which
most American judges and lawyers have always believed to have
supervisory authority over the lower federal courts.
Beyond the realm of federal case law, Smith’s 2011 treatise
has urged Indian Nations to proactively exercise their sovereignty,
not simply engage in negative defenses of it against federal
encroachment. He thus devoted the bulk of his treatise to
discussing and modeling affirmative tribal legislation to protect
310
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workers within Indian country.315 That is not only the right thing to
do, but will bolster the long-term cause of preserving tribal
sovereignty.
It is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of the battles
over the Coeur d’Alene doctrine chronicled in this article.
American Indian law remains on a knife edge. But I feel confident
that Indian Nations and their sovereignty will prevail.
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